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I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, those who were harmed by criminal acts involving handguns
were forced to seek recovery for their injuries by relying upon design defect and
failure to warn theories. However, courts usually rejected claims based on defective
design because the products performed exactly as they were intended to perform,'
while failure to warn claims failed when courts characterized gun-related hazards
as obvious risks for which no warning was needed.2
However, during the past decade legal commentators and plaintiffs' attorneys
have developed a new theory of liability known as negligent marketing.3 This
theory assumes that gun manufacturers and other sellers have a duty to market their
products in a manner that will not affirmatively increase a product's inherent risk
1. See, e.g., Downs v. R.T.S. Security, Inc., 670 So. 2d 434, 439 (La. Ct. App. 1996) ("Every
type of ammunition in a gun is a dangerous product, however, that danger relates to its function and
it cannot be said to be unreasonably dangerous because it has that function.").
2. See, e.g., Resteiner v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 566 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he manufacturer of a simple product has no
duty to warn of the product's potentially dangerous conditions or characteristics when they are readily
apparent.").
3. For a general discussion of negligent marketing theory, see Andrew Jay McClurg, The
Tortious Marketing of Handguns: Strict Liability Is Dead, Long Live Negligence, 19 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 777, 806-18 (1996).
NEGLIGENT MARKETING
to consumers and third parties.' At first, virtually all courts rejected negligent
marketing claims, but several years ago the tide seemed to turn when some courts
concluded that such claims might be actionable.6 The first case to allow a negligent
marketing claim was Hamilton v. Accu-Tek,7 decided by a federal district court in
New York in 1999. Shortly thereafter, a California intermediate appellate court
reached a similar conclusion in Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.8 These decisions had
provided plaintiffs' lawyers with a new and powerful legal theory to use against
handgun manufacturers. Furthermore, if injured parties eventually recovered
damages against handgun manufacturers, similar negligent marketing claims were
almost certain to be brought against the makers of handguns, cigarettes, alcoholic
beverages, pornography, and other potentially harmful but non-defective products.
Unfortunately for potential claimants (and their lawyers), much of the
momentum behind negligent marketing quickly dissipated. In 2001, the California
Supreme Court reversed the lower appellate court's decision inMerrill. In addition,
when the handgun manufacturer appealed the district court's decision inHamilton,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified the negligent marketing issue to the
New York Court of Appeals, 0 which eventually rejected negligent marketing as a
source of liability for producers of non-defective products."
One year later, the status of negligent marketing remains very much in doubt.
This Article will evaluate the concept of negligent marketing to see whether it ought
to become a part of our legal jurisprudence or whether it should be discarded as
doctrinally unsound, possibly harmful to important social and economic interests.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the negligent marketing theory.
Negligent marketing can be divided into three categories: (1) product designs that
make the product more attractive to criminals; (2) advertising and promotional
activities that target inappropriate users; and (3) product distribution practices that
facilitate retail sales of dangerous products to vulnerable or unsuitable users. The
first category of negligent marketing involves product design. Claims based on
product design rest on the notion that the manufacturer has designed the product in
such a way that it particularly appeals to those who are likely to misuse it.' Claims
4. Id. at 806 (advertising and promoting), 814 (noting distribution practices that target
consumers likely to misuse the product).
5. See infra Part IH.A.
6. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (involving
handguns); Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 189 (Ct. App. 1999) (involving
semiautomatic assault weapons).
7. 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
8. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Ct. App. 1999).
9. Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001), rev 'gMerrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr.
2d 146 (Ct App. 1999).
10. See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.3d 36,46 (2d Cir. 2000).
11. See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001) (rejecting the federal
district court's interpretation of New York law in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802
(E.D.N.Y. 1999)).
12. See, e.g., Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154-55 (describing features of the defendant's
semiautomatic pistol that made it appealing to criminals).
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that arise from negligent advertising or promotion typically involve targeting
consumers that are more likely than the general population to misuse the product
and thereby injure themselves or others. 3 The third category of negligent marketing
includes negligent distribution practices, which facilitate access to the pro duct at the
retail level by unsuitable or undesirable users. This category of negligent marketing
also imposes liability upon manufacturers that fail to control retail sales practices
in order to keep their products out of the hands of criminals and underage
consumers.14
Part III traces the history of negligent marketing in the courts. Negligent
marketing made its first appearance in the mid-1980s in such cases as Linton v.
Smith & Wesson," Riordan v. InternationalArmament Corp.,'6 and Knott v. Liberty
Jewelry & Loan, Inc.7 However, judicial reaction to negligent marketing claims
was universally hostile until 1997, when a federal appeals court decided McCarthy
v. Olin Corp. ' Although the court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case,
Judge Guido Calabresi, in a dissenting opinion, presented a strong argument for the
negligent marketing theory and urged the court to certify the question to the New
York Court of Appeals. 9 Since then, two courts have recognized negligent
marketing claims. In the first case, Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 0 Judge Jack Weinstein
allowed several victims of gun violence to present their negligent marketing claims
to a jury. However, on appeal the negligent marketing issue was certified to the
New York Court of Appeals,2' which concluded that New York law did not require
a defendant to exercise due care with respect to the marketing of its products.' In
a second case, Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.,' a California intermediate appellate court
also recognized a negligent marketing claim against a gun manufacturer. However,
this decision was reversed by the California Supreme Court in 2001 . Part III of the
Article also discusses some of the lawsuits that have been brought against gun
manufacturers by cities and other local governmental entities to recoup Medicaid
and law enforcement costs.
Part IV discusses some of the doctrinal issues that must be addressed if the
courts decide to impose liability upon product sellers for negligent marketing. These
issues involve the standard of care, cause-in-fact, and duty. The traditional
13. Id. at 155-58 (describing how the manufacturer allegedly directed its marketing efforts at
violence-prone groups).
14. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62F. Supp. 2d 802,829-31 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (reviewing evidence
suggesting that marketing practices of defendant gun manufacturer facilitated distribution of its
products to criminals through black market sales).
15. 469 N.E.2d 339 (I1. App. Ct. 1984).
16. 477 N.E.2d 1293 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
17. 748 P.2d 661 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
18. 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997).
19. Id. at 157-75 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
20. 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
21. See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2000).
22. See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1066 (N.Y. 2001).
23. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Ct. App. 1999).
24. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 134 (Cal. 2001).
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negligence standard of reasonable care provides little guidance to juries, particularly
in cases where manufacturers are charged with targeting vulnerable or violent
individuals. Problems also exist with applying the traditional standard of care in
cases where the manufacturer is accused of failing to prevent.its products from
being sold illegally.
Causation issues are also troublesome in negligent marketing cases. Since
plaintiffs would normally be unable to prove cause-in-fact using the traditional "but
for" or "sine qua non" test, courts would have to allow other methods of proving
causation, such as the "substantial factor" test or a probabilistic analysis ifplaintiffs
are to have any chance of winning. However, these approaches are highly
controversial and arguably unfair to defendants. Another causation issue arises
where a number of defendants manufacture similar products. Plaintiffs will seldom
prevail in such cases unless the courts are willing to apply novel theories of
causation, such as enterprise liability or market share liability.'
Duty is the key doctrinal issue in most negligent marketing cases. For many
courts, the distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance is critical to the
existence of a duty on the part of product manufacturers. Thus, a court is likely to
conclude that a manufacturer owes a duty to a person who is injured by a non-
defective product if it believes that the manufacturer's affirmative conduct created
or increased the risk of harm. On the other hand, courts are less likely to conclude
that such a duty exists if it characterizes the manufacturer's conduct as nonfeasance,
that is, failure to protect the plaintiff against criminal attack by third parties. So far,
the latter view seems to have prevailed. 6
Part V addresses a number of other issues. One concern is that private interest
groups and government entities will bring negligent marketing suits against certain
types of product manufacturers as a way of advancing their own regulatory agendas.
For example, they may bring suit against a particular manufacturer or industry in
order to obtain settlement terms that supplement existing regulatory measures with
respect to the promotion, sale, or use of their products. In other cases, lawsuits may
be brought for the sole purpose of obtaining judgments that will be substantial
enough to bankrupt companies that produce products the plaintiffs do not approve
of.
Another concern is that negligent marketing claims may unreasonably interfere
with the constitutional right of commercial speech. This particular problem arises
in cases where the seller's advertising provides factually correct information about
a product or expresses an opinion about lifestyle choices, such as "women need
handguns to protect themselves" or "smoking is cool." Imposing tort liability in
such cases arguably inhibits the free flow of information about products to certain
groups of consumers.
Finally, the negligent marketing theory of liability is inherently paternalistic
and elitist. It assumes that some consumers are incapable of making rational
25. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 843-46 (accepting market share liability).
26. See infra Part IV.C.
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decisions about what products to buy. This assumption, even if partly correct, is
troublesome when it is invoked to punish advertising that is directed at women,
minorities, or other "vulnerable" groups.
While acknowledging that imposing liability for negligent marketing would
encourage product sellers to act more responsibly and would also provide a source
of compensation for some accident victims, this Article concludes that doctrinal and
policy concerns outweigh these benefits.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF NEGLIGENT MARKETING THEORY
The principle of negligent marketing assumes that product sellers should not
engage in marketing strategies that increase the risk that their products will be
purchased by unsuitable users-persons who are more likely than ordinary
consumers to injure either themselves or others. Claims based on negligent
marketing can be divided into at least three categories, including those based on
product design, those based on advertising or promotional activities, and those
based on inadequate supervision of retail sellers.27 Each of these forms of negligent
marketing is discussed in more detail below.
A. Claims Based on Product Design
Negligent marketing claims based on product design should be distinguished
from a more conventional design defect claim. Normally, when a plaintiff brings
a design defect claim against a manufacturer, he alleges that the product, as
designed, is defective because the manufacturer has failed to use a safer, yet
feasible, alternative design.28 However, in a negligent marketing case the plaintiff
normally contends that some non-essential design feature enhances the product's
attractiveness to unsuitable users, thereby increasing the chance that these users will
cause injury to themselves or others. Perhaps the best known example of negligent
marketing based on product design involved the TEC-9 and TEC-DC9
semiautomatic pistols in Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.29 In this case, the plaintiff claimed
that these weapons were designed to accept large capacity magazines and also had
trigger systems that would permit them to be fired rapidly.3" In addition, the
manufacturer equipped these weapons with a sling device that allowed them to be
fired from the hip and threaded their barrels to enable silencers or flash suppressors
to be attached to them.31 According to the plaintiff, the TEC-9 and TEC-DC9 were
27. See generally McClurg, supra note 3, at 800-18 (discussing categories of negligent
marketing).
28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABiLITY § 2(b) (1998).
29. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Ct. App. 1999).
30. Id. at 154.
31. Id.
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not designed for sporting or self-defense purposes, but rather were designed to
appeal to drug dealers and other criminals?
2
In cases like Merrill, the negligent marketing theory will often be more useful
to plaintiffs than a conventional design defect claim. In a design defect case, the
plaintiff must prove that the product's design is defective. This effort typically
requires the plaintiff to show that marginal benefits of a feasible and safer
alternative design outweigh the marginal costs of the proposed design.33 When
complex products are involved, plaintiffs sometimes lose because they cannot
obtain credible evidence about the cost and feasibility of safer alternative designs.
The problem of proving the existence of a defect is even greater for plaintiffs who
are injured by inherently dangerous products, such as handguns, because there are
no safer alternative designs available for these products.34 However, since negligent
marketing focuses on the marketing process rather than whether the product is
defective, it allows parties who sue under this theory to sidestep the defect issue.
B. Claims Based on Advertising and Promotional Activities
Negligent marketing claims based on advertising and promotional activities
would impose liability on manufacturers and other sellers whose advertising and
promotional efforts induce certain types of consumers to purchase their products.
Specifically, product sellers would be subject to liability for such marketing
practices when they are specifically directed at vulnerable or dangerous consumers.
1. Targeting Vulnerable Consumers
One form of negligent marketing provides that a manufacturer may be held
liable if it deliberately targets consumers who are underage, inexperienced, mentally
unstable, or psychologically vulnerable. Anti-smoking advocates, for example,
contend that a considerable amount of cigarette advertising is deliberately
calculated to encourage teenagers to smoke.3 For instance, they claim that the
32. Id. at 154-55.
33. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Renewed Judicial Controversy OverDefectiveProductDesign:
Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REv. 773, 776 (1979) ("[Ijt is
necessary to assess the relative costs and benefits ofboth the defendant's design and safer alternatives
in order to determine whether a given product design is unreasonably risky and therefore legally
defective."); see also Michael D. Green, The Schizophrenia ofRisk-BenefitAnalysis in Design Defect
Litigation, 48 VAND.L.REV. 609, 619 (1995) ("Risk-benefit analysis operates at the margin-the utility
of the existing design compared to the alternative-not at the level of the entire product.").
34. See Richard C. Ausness, Product CategoryLiability: A CriticalAnalysis, 24 N.Ky. L.REv.
423,426-29 (1997).
35. See Carl T. Bogus, Gun Litigation and Societal Values, 32 CoNN.L.REv. 1353,1368 (2000);
Bruce A. Levin, The Liability of Tobacco Companies-Should Their Ashes Be Kicked?, 29 ARiz. L.
REV. 195,242-43 (1987); Daniel Hags Lowenstein, "Too Much Puff': Persuasion, Paternalism, and
Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1213 (1988); Frank J. Vandall, Reallocating the Costs
of Smoking: The Application ofAbsolute Liability to Cigarette Manufacturers, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 405,
419-20 (1991).
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infamous cartoon character, Joe Camel, was introduced to create a favorable
impression of smoking in the minds of young children.36 Likewise, some years ago,
Smith & Wesson initiated an advertising campaign that allegedly preyed on the
fears of women in order to induce them to purchase handguns for protection against
criminal attacks.37 Arguably, putting firearms into the hands of individuals who are
likely to be inexperienced in handling guns would greatly increase the risk of injury
to these individuals and to those around them.38
2. Targeting Dangerous Consumers
Another form of negligent marketing involves directing advertising and other
promotional efforts at persons who are likely to misuse the product and thereby
harm others.39 Advertising handguns or assault weapons to a "criminal clientele"
is an obvious example of this type of negligent marketing.40 In Merrill, the plaintiffs
contended that the defendant engaged in negligent marketing practices by
advertising its product in "soldier-of-fortune" and survivalist-type magazines,
emphasizing the TEC-DC9's high volume of firepower and its paramilitary
appearance, and touting the weapon's excellent resistence to fingerprints. 41 The
intermediate appellate court concluded that this sort of promotional activity
increased the risk of product misuse by criminals and was sufficient to subject the
defendant to liability.42
36. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence
of Market Manipulation, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1420, 1481 (1999) (concluding that Joe Camel appeals
to underage consumers); Kathleen J. Lester, Note, Cowboys, Camels, and CommercialSpeech: Is the
Tobacco Industry's Commodification of Childhood Protected by the First Amendment?, 24 N. KY. L.
Rnv. 615, 628-29 (1997) (arguing that Joe Camel-type advertising "encourage[s] acceptance of
smoking as a social norm in young children"); Erica Swecker, Note, Joe Camel: Will "Old Joe"
Survive?, 36 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 1519, 1519 (1995) ("Cigarette advertisements featuring a
'sunglass-sporting, phallic-nosed' camel named Joe, surrounded by his 'cool, jazz-playing, pool-
hustling, poker-playing, cigarette-smoking crowd' of camel-friends, have been accused of enticing
children to smoke."). But see Clay Calvert, Excising Media Images to Solve Societal Ills:
Communication, Media Effects, Social Science, and the Regulation of Tobacco Advertising, 27 Sw.
U. L. REv. 401, 422-27 (1998) (questioning whether "Joe Camel" advertisements affect the future
smoking behavior of children).
37. See Debra Dobray & Arthur J. Waldrop, Regulating Handgun Advertising Directed Toward
Women, 12 WHITIER L. Rsv. 113, 114 (1991) (describing Smith & Wesson advertisements that
offered tips to women on how to avoid being attacked).
38. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 36, at 1464 (claiming that female gun owners tend to take
gun safety less seriously than male gun owners).
39. See McClurg, supra note 3, at 806.
40. Id.
41. Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 156-57 (Ct. App. 1999).
42. Id. at 170-85. But see McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 157 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting
imposing a duty to protect against criminal acts by a buyer, based on negligent marketing, in the
absence of a special relationship); Leslie v. United States, 986 F. Supp. 900,912 (D.N.J. 1997) (same);
First Commercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin Eng'g, Inc., 900 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Ark. 1995) (same).
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C. Claims Based on Negligent Distribution Practices
A third form of negligent marketing would impose liability upon manufacturers
for engaging in negligent distribution practices. For example, liability might be
imposed when manufacturers distribute the product in such away that unauthorized
users are more easily able to obtain access to it at the retail level. Courts might also
hold manufacturers responsible for failing to supervise the actions of unscrupulous
retail sellers.
1. Distributing a Productso as to Facilitate Access to lt by Unauthorized
Users
This type of negligent marketing assumes that manufacturers should be held
liable when they employ methods of distribution that enable minors or other
unauthorized persons to illegally purchase their products on the retail market.43
Many handguns are shipped to one area of the country only to be transported
elsewhere and sold on the black market." In fact, this very argument was made in
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek." The plaintiffs alleged that gun manufacturers had
distributed large numbers of handguns to southeastern states, where gun regulations
were relatively lax, knowing that the guns would be bought, shipped to urban
centers in the Northeast, and sold illegally." The federal district court concluded
that the gun manufacturers had a duty to exercise due care in order to protect third
parties from being injured by illegal users of their products.' Specifically, in the
court's view, the defendants couldbe requiredto reduce the flow of handguns to the
Southeast.41 In addition, the court found that the defendants could have reduced
illegal gun sales by refusing to sell to disreputable gun dealers and by limiting sales
at unregulated gun shows.4
Recently, the distribution practices of Purdue Pharma, the manufacturer of the
prescription painkiller OxyContin, have been called into question. This drug is sold
in time-release form and is intended to treat those who suffer chronic pain from
such diseases as arthritis, back trouble, or cancer.50 However, when OxyContinpills
are crushed, users can achieve an immediate heroin-like high.5' OxyContin abuse
is a serious problem in many parts of the country, particularly Appalachia and a
43. See Doug Morgan, Comment, What in the Wide, Wide World of Torts Is Going On? First
Tobacco, Now Guns: An Examination of Hamilton v. Accu-Tek and the Cities 'Lawsuits Against the
Gun Industry, 69 MIss. L.J. 521, 550 (1999).
44. See Mark D. Polston, Civil Liabilityfor High Risk Gun Sales: An Approach to Combat Gun
Trafficking, 19 SETONHALLLEGIS. J. 821,829-36 (1995) (discussing distribution of guns on the black
market).
45. 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
46. Id. at 830.
47. Id. at 824.
48. Id. at 832.
49. Id. at 826.
50. See Paul Tough, The Alchemy of OxyContin, N.Y. TIMEs MAG., July 29, 2001, at 32, 32.
51. Id.
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number of urban areas.5' In one class action suit, the plaintiffs alleged that the
manufacturer and others "'were and are facilitating the inappropriate use of
OxyContin by supplying pharmacies in Mexico with OxyContin because they are
aware that members of the public can obtain OxyContin from these pharmacies
without a prescription.""'3 Although the makers of OxyContin deny that this sort of
abuse has occurred, the plaintiffs' claim is similar to the charges that have been
made in some cases against gun manufacturers.
2. Failing to Require Retailers to Take Reasonable Measures to Reduce
Product-Related Risks
Another form of negligent marketing would impose liability on manufacturers
who fail to warn retail sellers about the dangers of selling their products to persons
likely to misuse them. 4 Under this theory of negligent marketing, a manufacturer
may be required to provide retailers with a written "safe sales policy," notifying
them of the product's high potential for misuse or providing them with behavioral
profiles of likely misusers.5
For several years, victims of gun violence have urged courts to recognize this
form of negligent marketing. For example, in First Commercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin
Engineering,s1 the plaintiff argued that a handgun manufacturer should be held
liable for failing to provide its distributors and retailers with a safe-sales policy and
a profile of the point-of-purchase appearance and conduct of potential misusers."7
In another case, the plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that the manufacturer of "Black
Talon" ammunition should be held liable for failing to get retailers to remove the
product promptly from their shelves once the manufacturer had taken it off the
market.58
Negligent failure to supervise retailers is also becoming a problem for
manufacturers of prescription drugs. For example, users of the diet drug
combination Fen-Phen accused manufacturers of doing nothing to discourage
physicians from prescribing the drug to mildly overweight people for long-term use
even though nothing was known about the risks of such treatment.5 9 The drug was
approved by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) for use on a short-term basis
only by seriously obese persons.60 Plaintiffs in the OxyContin litigation will no
52. Id.
53. Rob Modic, OxyContin Class-Action SuitFiled, DAYTONDAILYNEws (Ohio), July 20,2001,
at lB.
54. See McClurg, supra note 3, at 814-15.
55. Id. at 814.
56. 900 S.W.2d 202 (Ark. 1995).
57. Id. at 203; see also Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661, 664 (Wash. CL
App. 1988) (noting plaintiff argues that gun wholesaler had a duty to provide retailer "safe marketing
guidelines").
58. Leslie v. United States, 986 F. Supp. 900, 911 (D.N.J. 1997).
59. See Caren A. Cristani, Comment, Product Liability and Prescription Diet Drug Cocktail,
Fen-Phen: A Hard Combination to Swallow, 15 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTHL. &POL'Y 207,221-23 (1998).
60. Id. at 211.
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doubt claim that the drug's manufacturer should have attempted to exercise some
control over some of the pain clinics in Appalachia that, until recently, prescribed
and sold huge amounts of OxyContin.
III. NEGLIGENT MARKETING CLAIMS IN THE COURTS
The first suits against handgun manufacturers were based on such theories as
failure-to-warn, defective design, and strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activities. Failure-to-warn claims were predicated on the notion that manufacturers
should warn purchasers to prevent firearms from falling into the hands of children
or criminals. But courts tended to regard these risks as obvious and declined to
impose an affirmative obligation on gun manufacturers to warn about them."
Design defect claims, for the most part, were also unsuccessful. - Courts required
plaintiffs to show that handguns were defective as a prerequisite to liability; the fact
that a handgun was inherently dangerous was not sufficient to establish that it was
defectively designed.63 Courts also rejected the theory, known as "product category
liability,"' under which guns could be labeled as defective simply because the risks
associated with their use exceeded the social utility of gun ownership.65 Finally,
courts refused to subject gun manufacturers to liability on the theory that they were
engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity.66 These courts observed that the
61. See, e.g., Raines v. ColtIndus., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 819,825-26 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (ruling that
manufacturer had no duty to warn because risk ofpistol firing round left in the chamber after clip was
removed was "open and obvious"); Resteiner v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 566 N.W.2d 53,56 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1997) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (declaring that handgun manufacturer
did not have a duty to warn purchasers about the risk of theft).
62. See, e.g., Bolduc v. Colt's Mfg. Co., 968 F. Supp. 16, 18 (D. Mass. 1997) (rejecting claim
that handgun was defectively designed because it did not have "magazine disconnect" feature).
63. See Downs v. R.T.S. Security, Inc., 670 So. 2d 434 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
64. See Ausness, supra note 34; James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the
American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection ofLiability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1263, 1297-1300 (1991); Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category
Liability andAlternative Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1429, 1440-54
(1994); Shaun R. Bonney, Comment, Using Courts to Target Firearm Manufacturers, 37 IDAHO L.
REV. 167, 177-81 (2000).
65. See, e.g., Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988); Shipman v. Jennings
Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532 (1lth Cir. 1986); Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir.
1986); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985); Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758,
760-62 (D.C. 1989); Riordan v. Int'l Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985);
Richardson v. Holland, 741 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc.,
748 P.2d 661 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). But see Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1159 (Md.
1985) (holding that the risks of"Saturday Night Special" handguns outweighed their utility).
66. See, e.g., Copier ex rel Lindsey v. Smith & Wesson, 138 F.3rd 833, 838 (10th Cir. 1998);
Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 843 F.2d 406,407 (10th Cir. 1988); Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d
1326, 1328 (9th Cir. 1986); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1268 (5th Cir. 1985); Martin v.
Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1203-05 (7th Cir. 1984); Caveny v. Raven Arms Co.,
665 F. Supp. 530, 531-32 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd, 849 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1988); Delahanty v.
Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758,760-62 (D.C. 1989); Coulson v. DeAngelo, 493 So. 2d 98, 99 (Fla. Ct. App.
1986); Addison v. Williams, 546 So. 2d 220,223-24 (La. Ct. App. 1989); King v. R.G. Indus., Inc.,
451 N.W.2d 874, 875 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 704 P.2d 118, 120-22
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doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities, as codified by the
Restatement of Torts, was aimed at dangerous activities on one's land and did not
apply to the manufacture or sale of dangerous products. 7
Frustrated in their efforts to recover from handgun manufacturers under
traditional principles of products liability law, in the 1980s plaintiffs' lawyers began
to embrace negligent marketing as a potential basis of recovery for gun-related
injuries. At first, the courts showed little enthusiasm for this new theory, concluding
that manufacturers had no duty to prevent their products from falling into the hands
of criminals.68 Beginning in 1997, however, this attitude began to change. In
McCarthy v. Olin Corp.,69 for example, former Yale Law School Dean Guido
Calabresi, in a lengthy and well-reasoned dissent, argued that New York courts
might (and should) recognize a duty on the part of gun manufacturers to market
their products more responsibly.7 Two years later, Judge Jack Weinstein, another
distinguished legal scholar, concluded in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek" that gun
manufacturers were in fact subject to such a duty under New York law, In that same
year, a California intermediate appellate court also upheld a plaintiff's negligent
marketing claim in Merrill v. Navegar.72 However, all of this forward progress
came to a halt in 2001 when lower court decisions in Hamilton and Merrill were
effectively reversed.73
A. Early Cases
One of the first negligent marketing cases was Linton v. Smith & Wesson,74
decided in 1984. In that case, the plaintiff, who was shot in a tavern brawl, argued
that the defendant manufacturer had "a duty to use 'reasonable means to prevent the
sale of its handguns to persons who are likely to cause harm to the public.",' 75 To
(Or. 1985); Diggles v. Horwitz, 765 S.W.2d 839, 841-42 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Knott v. Liberty
Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661, 664-65 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988); see also Charles E. Cantu,
Distinguishing the Concept of Strict Liability for Ultrahazardous Activities from Strict Products
Liability Under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: Two Parallel Lines of Reasoning
That Should Never Meet, 35 AKRON L. REv. 31 (2001).
67. Andrew 0. Smith, Comment, The Manufacture and Distribution of Handguns as an
Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 369, 380-83 (1987).
68. See, e.g., First Commercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin Eng'g, Inc., 900 S.W.2d 202,204-05 (Ark.
1995) (finding no duty for tort liability resulting from third party's criminal acts without special duty);
Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 469 N.E.2d 339, 340 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (finding no Illinois precedent
for a duty); Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661, 664 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988)
(concluding that defendants met legislative guidelines for marketing guns and these regulations
preempted finding a duty in this case).
69. 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997).
70. Id. at 157-75 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
71. 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
72. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Ct. App. 1999).
73. See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001); Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.,
28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
74. 469 N.E.2d 339 (Il. App. Ct. 1984).
75. Id. at 340.
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support his claim that a duty existed, the plaintiff relied on Semeniuk v. Chentis76
andMoning v. Alfono. In Semeniuk, a retailer was held liable for selling an air rifle
to an adult and his seven-year-old son.7' The court concluded that it should have
been obvious to the seller that the child, for whom the air rifle was purchased,
lacked sufficient judgment and experience to use the rifle safely.79 In Moning, the
Michigan Supreme Court remanded for anew trial, finding that a manufacturer who
marketed dangerous toy slingshots directly to young children owed a "legal
obligation of due care to a bystander affected by use of the product." 8 However, the
court inLinton determined that these cases were not controlling and concluded that
the defendant did not owe any duty to control the distribution of its products to
adults at the retail level."'
The following year, another Illinois intermediate appellate court reached the
same conclusion in Riordan v. International Arinament Corp.82 Riordan involved
a claim by several shooting victims that the defendant "manufacturers and
distributors were negligent in marketing its[sic] handguns to the general public
without taking adequate precautions to prevent the sale of its' [sic] handguns to
persons who were reasonably likely to cause harm to the general public."83 In effect,
the plaintiffs contended that the manufacturers and distributors of "Saturday Night
Specials" had an affirmative duty to oversee the conduct of retail sellers in order to
prevent these firearms from falling into the hands of unsuitable buyers.8 4 However,
the court, relying on Linton, refused to find that such a duty existed and affirmed
the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' case.8
The plaintiff in Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc.86 made a similar
argument. Because the gun in question, also a "Saturday Night Special," was
produced by a foreign manufacturer, the plaintiff was forced to sue the wholesaler
and distributor instead. The plaintiff alleged that "Saturday Night Specials" had no
legitimate purpose and were often used to commit crimes.87 In addition, the plaintiff
claimed that the wholesaler and distributor were aware of the risk that gun sales
posed to the public.88 Consequently, the plaintiff argued, the wholesaler and
distributor had a duty to warn retailers of the dangerous propensities of "Saturday
Night Specials" and to provide them with guidelines to help them market these
handguns safely.89 Nevertheless, the Washington court refused to find that such a
76. 117 N.E.2d 883 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954).
77. 254 N.W.2d 759 (Mich. 1977).
78. Semeniuk, 117 N.E.2d at 883.
79. Id. at 884.
80. Moning, 254 N.W.2d at 775.
81. Linton, 469 N.E.2d at 340.
82. 477 N.E.2d 1293 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
83. Id. at 1295.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1299.
86. 748 P.2d 661 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
87. Id. at 664.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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duty existed and instead affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiffs
negligence suit.9"
In First Commercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin Engineering, Inc.,9 the victim was
killed by her former boyfriend, a psychopath who had been in and out of mental
institutions prior to the shooting.92 The killer had purchased a cheap handgun
manufactured by the defendant three days before the murder was committed.93 The
victim's personal representative argued that the defendant was negligent in
promoting and selling inexpensive handguns to a market that included a substantial
number ofpersons who were likely to commit criminal acts.94 Affirming ajudgment
of the lower court in favor of the defendant, the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded
that the manufacturer owed no duty to protect the victim against criminal misuse of
its products in the absence of a special relationship. 9
Plaintiffs also brought a negligent marketing claim in Forni v. Ferguson.96
Forni involved a suit in the New York state courts against the manufacturers of a
semi-automatic handgun, magazine, and ammunition that Colin Ferguson used in
an assault on a commuter train in 1993. 9' The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
breached their duty of care by marketing such dangerous products to the general
public. 98 However, the court concluded that the manufacturers were not obliged to
refrain from marketing non-defective, legal products so they breached no duty to
the plaintiffs merely by placing such products in the stream of commerce?
In Resteiner v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.,' a Michigan intermediate appellate court
rejected a negligent marketing claim brought by the personal representatives oftwo
individuals who Ronnie Johns intentionally shot and killed during the summer of
1991.101 The murders were committed with a .44 caliber Redhawk magnum
revolver manufactured by defendant Sturm Ruger, which had been stolen from the
house of another defendant, Brent Walker, in May 1991"2 The plaintiffs claimed,
inter alia, "that Sturm, Ruger was negligent for marketing its Redhawk revolvers
to members of the general public, such as Walker."' 3 Relying on Buczkowski v.
McKay0 4 and King v. R. G. Industries, Inc.,05 the Michigan court concluded that the
90. Id.
91. 900 S.W.2d 202 (Ark. 1995).
92. See McClurg, supra note 3, at 811.
93. Id.
94. Lorcin Eng'g, 900 S.W.2d at 203.
95. Id. at 205.
96. 648 N.Y.S.2d 73 (App. Div. 1996).
97. Id. Six passengers were killed in the attack and another nineteen people were wounded.
McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 1997).
98. McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 916 F. Supp. 366, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
99. Id. at 370-71.
100. 566 N.W.2d 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
101. Id. at 55.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 56.
104. 490 N.W.2d 330 (Mich. 1992), reh "g denied, 491 N.W.2d 830 (Mich. 1992).
105. 451 N.W.2d 874 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
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gun manufacturer owed no duty to refrain from selling its products to the general
public."6 In Buczowski, the Michigan Supreme Court refused to hold a retailer
liable for selling shotgun shells to an intoxicated customer who subsequently shot
the plaintiff. 7 The court in King held that the manufacturer of a non-defective
"Saturday Night Special" was not liable for injuries to a third party committed by
a retail customer who was mentally unstable and had a criminal record.'0 8 The
Resteiner court concluded that these cases supported the principle that sellers
ordinarily had no duty to exercise control over the distribution of non-defective
products to the general public.0 9
Leslie v. United States"' involved a suit by individuals who were killed or
wounded by Christopher Green during an attempted robbery at a post office in
Montclair, New Jersey."' The plaintiffs brought suit against the manufacturer of
Black Talon bullets, which were used by the robber to kill or wound them." 2
Among other things, the plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer, Olin Corporation,
negligently marketed the Black Talon bullets by emphasizing their destructive
capability in a way that would appeal to criminals." 3 The plaintiffs also argued that
Olin was negligent because it failed to ensure that retailers promptly removed the
Black Talon bullets from their shelves after Olin stopped selling the bullets to the
general public."'
Like other courts before it, the federal district court in Leslie also focused on
the duty issue, observing that duty involves more than the foreseeability of harm." 5
The court observed that no special relationship existed between the defendant and
Green, the purchaser of the ammunition, that would enable it to control or prevent
Green's criminal behavior' 6 In the court's view, "[t]he absence of any such
relationship, even where Green's misconduct was arguably foreseeable, militates
against imposing on Olin a duty to refrain from advertising the distinguishing
characteristics of its ammunition.""' 7 Furthermore, since the manufacturer couldnot
exercise any control over the conduct of others, the court concluded that it would
be futile to impose such a duty on it."
8
106. Resteiner, 566 N.W.2d at 56.
107. Buczkowski, 490 N.W.2d at 332, 336.
108. King, 451 N.W.2d at 875.
109. Resteiner, 566 N.W.2d at 56.
110. 986 F. Supp. 900 (D.N.J. 1997).
111. Id. at 902.
112. Id. Theplaintiffs also sued the federal government for failing to provide adequate security
at the post office. Id.
113. Id. at911.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Leslie, 986 F. Supp. at 912.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 913.
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B. McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.
The plaintiffs in McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.," 9 like those in Forni, were
victims of Colin Ferguson's shooting spree on a Long Island Railroad passenger
train.12 Unlike Forni, the McCarthy lawsuit was directed solely at the Olin
Corporation, which had allegedly manufactured the ammunition Ferguson used in
the shooting. " These hollow-point bullets, which were marketed under the "Black
Talon" trademark, employed a design that greatly enhanced their destructive
power."z The plaintiffs argued that Olin was negligent in marketing Black Talon
ammunition to the general public instead of restricting its sale to law enforcement
agencies as the company had originally intended. 123 The plaintiffs also claimed that
advertisements for the Black Talon bullets emphasized their destructive
characteristics in a way that appealed to criminals.' 24 Finally, the plaintiffs
contended that the mere act of marketing Black Talon ammunition gave rise to a
duty on the part of the manufacturer to protect all those who might be affected by
such a dangerous product.2 ' A federal district court judge granted Olin
Corporation's motion to dismiss'26 and this decision was affirmed on appeal.'27 The
plaintiff argued that the manufacturer owed a duty when it marketed the Black
Talon ammunition to the general public because misuse of its product by criminals
was foreseeable.'28 The court, however, interpreting New York law, rejected the
notion that duty could be based solely on the foreseeability of harm.' 9 Rather, in
the court's view, foreseeability served only to define the scope of an existing
duty. '3 The court also observed that New York state courts had traditionally been
reluctant to impose a duty on someone to control the actions of another in the
absence of a special relationship that gave the defendant some control over that
person's conduct.' In this case, the court concluded, there was no special
relationship between the defendant and Ferguson that enabled it to control
Ferguson's actions."' Absent such a relationship, the federal appellate court
119. 916 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'dsub nom. McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148
(2d Cir. 1997). In addition to negligent marketing, the plaintiffs also based their claims on negligent
manufacturing, defective design and ultrahazardous (or abnormally dangerous) activity. Id. at 369-72.
120. Id. at 368.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 369. Prior to Ferguson's attack, Olin Corporation had withdrawn the Black Talon
bullets from the public market and restricted their sale to law enforcement officers. Ferguson,
however, purchased the ammunition before it was withdrawn from the market. McCarthy v. Olin
Corp., 119 F.3d at 152.
124. McCarthy v. Sturm Ruger & Co., 916 F. Supp. at 369.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 372.
127. McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d at 157.
128. Id. at 156.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 157.
132. Id.
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declined to hold the Olin Corporation liable for its marketing practices.'33 The court
also expressed concern that imposing liability for negligent marketing in this case
would subject the defendant to unlimited liability and drive a legal, and possibly
useful, product offthe market.'34 Finally, the court suggested that the legislature and
not the courts should determine what products should or should not be sold to the
public.
135
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Guido Calabresi maintained that the court should
have certified the negligent marketing issue to the New York Court of Appeals
instead of upholding the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim.
According to Judge Calabresi, negligent marketing theory arguably fits within the
scope of a traditional negligence claim and the New York Court of Appeals might
well adopt the theory even though the lower New York courts had not yet done
so.'37 To support this conclusion, Calabresi discussed each of the elements of a
traditional negligence claim-unreasonable conduct, damages, causation and
duty-in the context of the defendant's conduct.
138
First, Judge Calabresi determined that the manufacturer's decision to market
Black Talon ammunition to the general public might be considered unreasonable
if one weighed its destructive capability against its limited value to ordinary
members of the public. 39 Thus, selling Black Talon ammunition to private
individuals might be likened to selling firearms to children or supplying liquor to
intoxicated adults." Secondly, Calabresi concluded that the plaintiffs had sustained
substantial injuries as a consequence of the defendant's decision to sell Black Talon
ammunition to members of the general public.' 4' Furthermore, Calabresi found that
the defendant's conduct was both a cause-in-fact and a proximate cause of the
plaintiffs' injuries."'2 Specifically, Calabresi observed that the possibility of
intervening criminal conduct, such as that of Colin Ferguson, was precisely the type
of risk that made the defendant's conduct unreasonable, thereby undermining the
argument that Ferguson's intervening criminal act was an unforeseeable
superseding cause."
On the issue of duty, Judge Calabresi agreed with the majority that under New
York law, duty was not based solely on foreseeability of harm to another, but rather
depended on public policy."' While acknowledging that the New York courts had
not explicitly imposed a duty of care on manufacturers with respect to their
133. McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d at 157.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. Id. (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 168 n.20 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 161-70 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
139. McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d at 162 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 163 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 164 (Calabresi, L, dissenting).
142. Id. at 164-65 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 165 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 165-66 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
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marketing decisions, Calabresi pointed out that the courts had historically
recognized the obligation of sellers to protect others, including bystanders, against
the risks associated with their products, including risks created by product
misuse.14 In view of the dangerous nature of the defendant's product and its ability
to reduce product-related risks by more restrictive marketing practices, Calabresi
reasoned that New York courts could appropriately impose a duty on the
manufacturers to exercise greater care in the way they marketed dangerous
products."4
C. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek
In Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 4 7 a group of plaintiffs brought negligent marketing
claims in a New York federal district court against twenty-five handgun
manufacturers. 148 The plaintiffs argued that the defendants had a duty to market and
distribute their products in a manner that would minimize the chances that the
handguns would fall into the hands of persons likely to use them to commit
crimes.' 49 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants shipped large numbers of
firearms to southeastern states with less stringent gun regulations knowing that
these guns would be eventually transported to northeastern states and sold
illegally. 50
The defendants maintained that they had no duty to protect shooting victims
from the criminal acts of third parties.' They also denied that their marketing
practices were negligent and further contended that the plaintiffs had failed to
satisfactorily prove cause-in-fact.'52 However, Jack Weinstein, the trial judge,
concluded that the defendants did have a duty to market their products in a
reasonable and prudent manner.' 53 In addition, he relieved the plaintiffs of the
burden of showing which specific product caused which injury and instead allowed
them to establish causation through a market share liability approach.'54
Judge Weinstein's opinion discussed a variety of legal issues associated with
the plaintiffs' claims, including: (1) whether gun manufacturers owed any legal
duty to bystanders who might be injured by firearms;' (2) whether the defendants
failed to exercise due care with respect to their marketing activities;'56 (3) whether
the marketing practices of the defendants caused the victims' injuries; l" r (4) whether
145. McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d at 166-67 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 168-69 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
147. 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
148. Id. at 808.
149. Id. at 825.
150. Id. at 832.
151. Id. at817.
152. Id. at 817-18.
153. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 827.
154. Id. at 843-44.
155. Id. at 818-27.
156. Id. at 827-33.
157. Id. at 833.
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the criminal acts of third persons amounted to a superseding cause, thereby
relieving the defendants of any responsibility for the shooting victims' injuries;"'
and (5) whether gun manufacturers collectively couldbe held liable for damages on
a market share basis.159
The first issue in Hamilton was the scope of the defendants' duty toward the
plaintiffs. One aspect of the duty issue was whether the defendants were obliged to
protect casual bystanders from injuries caused by non-defective products. While
admitting that New York law subjected a manufacturer to strict liability only when
it placed a defective product into the stream of commerce, 6' the court concluded
that negligence principles were broad enough to support a duty of due care even in
the case of non-defective products.' The court acknowledged that New York
courts had not yet recognized a duty of care toward bystanders in connection with
marketing and distributing dangerous, non-defective products, butpredictedthat the
courts would eventually do so because "[cI]hanging dangers and relationships in the
real world create the need for the law continually to redefine the parameters of
duty."'1
62
The court also considered whether manufacturers were legally obligated to
protect individuals against the criminal acts of others. The court examined three
reasons for imposing such a duty on the defendants. First, a duty to protect against
third-party criminal behavior could arise out of the relationship between the
defendant and the victim.'63 Thus, the relationship between carrier and passenger
or tavern owner and patron, which provides the defendant with the power to
minimize a risk, would thereby obligate him to take reasonable measures to protect
the plaintiff against such a risk, including the risk of criminal misconduct by
another.' 6 InHamilton, the court concluded that a manufacturer's special ability to
detect and to guard against the risks associated with its products gave rise to a
"protective relationship" vith those who mightbe injured. 65 According to the court,
recognition of such a relationship was especially appropriate when the risk of injury
due to criminal misconduct was not merely foreseeable, but actually highly likely
to occur.
166
The court observed that a duty to protect against third parties might also arise
out of a relationship between the defendant and a third party, such as a parent and
child or an employer and an employee. This duty is traditionally based on the
ability of the defendant to control the actions of the third party. According to the
court, such a relationship might be found to exist between gun manufacturers and
158. Id. at 833-34.
159. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 839-40.
160. Id. at 823.
161. Id. at 823-24.
162. Id. at 824.
163. Id. at 820.
164. Id. at 824.
165. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 821.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 820.
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downstream distributors and retailers. 6 ' Gun manufacturers could refuse to supply
firearms to distributors or retailers who habitually allowed firearms to fall into the
hands of criminals*
69
Finally, a duty to protect against third-party acts could also arise when the
defendant affirmatively enhanced an inherent risk.170 In this case, while there was
some risk that criminals would acquire handguns and use them to harm others
regardless of what the manufacturer did, the court concluded that the
manufacturers' marketing practices greatly increased this background risk by
making it easier for criminals to get their hands on firearms.
171
Having concluded that gun manufacturers owed a duty to protect potential
shooting victims from criminal attack, the court then considered whether the
manufacturers had breached this duty. The court observed that the risk of injury was
very great if handguns fell into the hands of those who were likely to use them to
commit crimes.' According to expert testimony presented at the trial, gun-related
deaths and injuries, particularly among young people, had risen dramatically since
1985.7s Moreover, contrary to popular belief, most guns used in crimes were not
stolen, but were purchased, directly or indirectly, from federally licensed firearms
dealers.Y4 The evidence showed that minors and felons often used "straw men" to
purchase guns for them, and disreputable dealers falsified ATF Firearm Transaction
Records at the time of purchase.17 In the court's view, the defendants could have
reduced these illegal sales by refusing to do business with careless or unscrupulous
gun dealers, by limiting sales at unregulated gun shows, and by requiring that
handguns be sold to the public only in responsibly operated retail stores. 6 The
court also found that the defendants were fully aware that their marketing practices
facilitated moving guns from the Southeast into the underground markets in the
Northeast. 71 Even though some gun manufacturers and distributors had tried to
regulate retail sales, many others had turned a blind eye to the problem.
Another issue was whether the defendants' marketing practices were a cause-
in-fact of shooting deaths generally, and whether there was some causal connection
between these practices and the injuries suffered by specific individuals. 179 The trial
168. Id.
169. Id. at 821-22.
170. Id. at 822.
171. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 822. The court described the defendants' conduct as an
"enabling tort" because it greatly facilitated the ability of others to do harm. This concept of enabling
torts was first articulated by Professor Robert Rabin. See Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL
L. REv. 435 (1999).
172. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 825-26; see also Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307,
1313-14 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (reviewing data and supporting sources).
173. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 825-26.
174. Id. at 825.
175. Id. at 826.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 832.
178. Id.
179. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 834-35.
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court accepted the plaintiffs' contention that negligently marketing handguns should
be treated like a toxic tort case." In such cases, the plaintiffs were often permitted
to prove general causation by using epidemiological evidence.'81 Plaintiffs could
then use medical testimony to show that the toxic substance in question more likely
than not caused a specific plaintiffs injuries." 2 In addition, when more than one
defendant has marketed an essentially fungible product, a number of states have
shifted the burden of proof on this aspect of the causation issue. 8 In this case, the
court found that there was ample evidence to support the conclusion that the
defendants' marketing practices had facilitated an influx of illegal firearms into
New York City' 4 and made them readily available to the sort of person who had
injured the plaintiff, Stephen Fox."85
The fourth issue before the court involved proximate cause. The defendants
argued the traditional position that the criminal actions of third parties should be
treated as unforeseeable superseding events that broke the chain of causation and
relieved them of liability." 6 However, the court pointed out that an intervening act
would not be sufficient to insulate a defendant from liability when it was a natural
and foreseeable consequence of a condition created by the defendant.18 7 Since the
court had already determined that the defendants had a duty to anticipate and guard
against misuse of its products by third parties, the court had no difficulty concluding
that such misuse, when it did occur, was not a superseding cause.
188
The final issue before the court was the applicability of market share liability.8 9
The court observed that gun manufacturers were in a better position than victims
to bear the costs of gun-related injuries; that it was fair to impose this burden upon
gun manufacturers because they had voluntarily chosen to employ marketing
practices that increased the risk of injury to individuals like the plaintiffs; that
forcing gun manufacturers to internalize the social costs of their enterprise would
encourage them to produce safer products; and that accident victims in such cases
have not chosen to expose themselves to these sorts of product-related risks. 9 In
180. Id. at 834.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lily & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989) (involving DES);
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (involving DES).
184. Id. at 836-37.
185. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 837-38.
186. Id. at 818, 833.
187. Id. at 833 (quoting Kush v. City of Buffalo, 449 N.E.2d 725, 729 (N.Y. 1983)).
188. Id. at 834.
189. Id. For a discussion of market share liability, see DAVID G. OWEN, M. STUART MADDEN &
MARY J. DAVIs, 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODucrs LIABILITY § 24:6 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter
MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODucTs LABiLrry]; David A. Fischer, Products Liability-An Analysis of
Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1623 (1981); Frank J. Gilberti, Emerging Trends for
Products Liability: Market Share Liability, Its History and Future, 15 TouRo L. R v. 719 (1999);
Andrew R. Klein, Beyond DES: Rejecting the Application of Market Share Liability in Blood
Products Litigation, 68 TuL. L. REv. 883 (1994).
190. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 843-44.
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addition, the court concluded that the relative fungibility of handguns strengthened
the case for imposing market share liability on the defendant gun manufacturers.' 9'
Accordingly, the trial court approved instructions that allowed the jury to apportion
damages among the gun manufacturers according to their respective shares of the
handgun market. 
192
At the end of the trial, the jury found fifteen of the twenty-five defendants
negligent and returned damages in favor of one of the plaintiffs. 93 The defendants
moved for a judgment NOV, and when the trial court denied this motion, the
defendants appealed. 9 4 On appeal, the defendants citedMcCarthy andForni for the
proposition that they owed no duty to the plaintiffs under New York law. 9 They
also contended that apportioning damages on a market share basis was
"impermissible under New York law."' 96 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
decided to certify the following questions to the New York Court of Appeals: (1)
did New York recognize a duty on the part of gun manufacturers to exercise due
care with respect to the marketing and distribution of firearms; and (2) can damages
in negligent marketing cases be apportioned according to principles of market share
liability? 97 The New York Court of Appeals agreed to answer these certified
questions.
In its discussion of the duty issue, the New York court observed that in order
to avoid the possibility of unlimited liability, the plaintiff could not. recover
damages by alleging that a product manufacturer owed "a general duty to society"
at large, but was required to show that it owed "a specific duty to him or her."'98 In
addition, the court showed considerable reluctance to impose a duty upon a
defendant to control the conduct of others.' 99 To be sure, such a duty would be
recognized when a relationship exists between the defendant and a third-party
tortfeasor that gives the defendant actual control over the third person's actions. 20
This sort of relationship might include that of employer and employee or parent and
child.20 ' A duty might also exist when there was a special relationship between the
defendant and the plaintiff, such as the relationship of common carriers to their
passengers, which required a defendant to protect the plaintiff from the acts of
others.20 2
In this case, the court found that the connection between manufacturer and
criminal, as well as the connection between manufacturer and victim, to be
191. Id. at 844-46.
192. Id. at 846-47.
193. Id. at 808.
194. See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 2000).
195. Id. at 42; see McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997); Forni v. Ferguson, 648
N.Y.S. 2d 73 (App. Div. 1996).
196. Hamilton, 222 F.3d at 41.
197. Id. at 46.
198. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (N.Y. 2001).
199. Id. at 1061.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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extremely remote." 3 According to the court, the typical chain of distribution
included the manufacturer, a federally licensed wholesaler or distributor, the first
retailer, subsequent legal purchasers, and the person who actually committed the
crime.2 In view of the attenuated connection between the manufacturer and either
the tortfeasor or the victim, the court felt it was unrealistic to expect the
manufacturer to exercise any meaningful control over the conduct of others further
down the chain of distribution."' That being the case, the court saw little sense in
imposing a duty upon the manufacturer to protect victims against the criminal acts
of third parties.20
The New York Court of Appeals rejected several other duty-related theories
proposed by the plaintiffs. For example, the plaintiffs suggested that the
manufacturer's superior ability to detect and prevent product-related risks created
a "protective relationship" between the manufacturer and those who might be
harmed by its products.0 7 However, the court refused to impose such a duty upon
a manufacturer unless its products were defective. 8 The plaintiffs also contended
that the manufacturer owed a duty to potential victims because of its ability to
reduce the risk of illegal trafficking by controlling the distribution process. 0 9 This
argument also failed to persuade the court, which concludedthat imposing a general
duty of care on this basis would not only create an indeterminate class of potential
plaintiffs, but would also impose liability in cases where such liability might not
have any effect on illegal gun sales.210 Finally, the court declined to impose a duty
of care upon gun manufacturers under the negligent entrustment doctrine." While
the court acknowledged that a plaintiff might invoke the negligent entrustment
doctrine where the manufacturer sold its products to specific distributors who were
known to be engaged in illegal gun trafficking on a significant and consistent basis,
it refused to apply the doctrine in a case where the plaintiffs produced merely
general evidence of gun trafficking."
Turning to the question of market share liability, the New York Court of
Appeals also agreed with the defendants' position. The trial court had permitted the
jury to apportion the plaintiff's damage award according to the principles of market
share liability,2"3 and the jury had accordingly apportioned damages among three
203. Id. at 1061-62.
204. Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d at 1062.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1061-62.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1062-63.
209. Id. at 1063.
210. Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d at 1063.
211. Id. at 1064. For a discussion of negligent entrustment, see generally MADDEN & OWEN ON
PRODucrs LiABiLrry, supra note 189, § 19.1; Robert M. Howard, Note, The Negligent Commercial
Transaction Tort: Imposing CommonLawLiabilityonMerchantsforSales andLeasesto "Defective"
Customers, 1988 DUKE L.. 755.
212. Id.
213. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 843-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
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gun manufacturers.2"4 However, the New York Court of Appeals determined that
market share liability was inappropriate in gun injury cases because firearms were
not a fungible product like DES, and victims, at least in theory, could identify the
actual manufacturers.2"5 In addition, because the degree of risk created by gun
manufacturers varied considerably, the court concluded that apportioning liability
on market share basis alone would be unfair. 216
Upon receiving the answer of the New York Court of Appeals to its certified
questions, the Second Circuit ordered that the plaintiffs' lawsuit be dismissed,
thereby ending their seven-year-long effort to obtain damages from defendant gun
manufacturers.2 7
D. Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.
Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.2"' involved a suit against the manufacturer of two
semiautomatic assault weapons, the TEC-9 and the TEC-DC9 (hereinafter referred
to collectively as the "TEC-DC9"). Gian Ferri used these weapons to kill eight
persons and wound six others before killing himself.219 Ferri apparently purchased
the guns from properly licensed dealers; however, he violated the law by
transporting the weapons from Nevada, where they were legal, to California, where
they were not."0 The plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that even though the guns sales
were legal, the defendant, Navegar, should be held liable because it had promoted
and marketed its products in a way that increased their appeal to those who were
likely to commit criminal acts.22' The trial court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment and the plaintiffs appealed.222
According to the California intermediate appellate court, both the physical
characteristics of these weapons and the manner in which they were marketed
greatly increased the risk that they would be acquired and used for criminal
purposes.'m The court observed that the weapons were designed to accept large
capacity fifty-round magazines and equipped with "barrel shrouds," which allowed
the user to more easily spray fire. 4 The barrels were threaded to allow attaching
silencers or flash suppressors. 5 The weapons were fitted with a sling device, which
214. Id. at811.
215. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1066-67 (N.Y. 2001).
216. Id.
217. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21, 32 (2d Cir. 2001).
218. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Ct. App. 1999).
219. Id. at 152.
220. Id. at 153.
221. Id. at 159-60. The plaintiffs also claimed that the manufacture and sale of the TEC-DC9
semi-automatic pistol was an ultrahazardous activity. Id. at 152. The court affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of that claim. Id. at 190-92.
222. Id. at 152.
223. Id. at 165-69.
224. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154.
225. Id.
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enabled them to be fired rapidly from the hip. 6 They were compact and capable
of being broken down for better concealment, and they were compatible with a
"Hell Fire" trigger system, which permitted the weapon to be fired at a much faster
rate than a normal semiautomatic weapon.2 7 Moreover, a TEC-DC9 equipped with
such a trigger mechanism could easily be modified to perform like a fully automatic
weapon."8 These features not only made the TEC-DC9 function like a military-
style submachine gun, they also substantially reduced the weapon's utility for
legitimate purposes such as hunting, sport shooting, or self defense.'
The court also pointed out that Navegar seemed to have deliberately targeted
their marketing of the TEC-DC9 toward persons, like Feni, who were attracted to
or associated with violence.3 First of all, the defendant advertised its products in
magazines, such as Soldier of Fortune, SWAT, Combat Handguns, Guns,
Firepower, and Heavy Metal Weapons, that were widely read by militarists and
survivalists." Moreover, this advertising emphasized the paramilitary character of
its weapons by referring to their "'military non-glare' finish and 'combat-type'
sights." '' In addition, Navegar's promotional materials called attention to certain
features ofthe TEC-DC9 that wouldmake itparticularly suitable for criminal use. 3
In addition to the combat sling and threaded barrel, Navegar extolled the fact that
the TEC-DC9's surface had "excellent resistence to filngerprints." 4 Furthermore,
Navegar displayed its weapons at the sort of gun shows that violence-oriented
persons often attended. 3 Finally, Navegar provided TEC-DC9s for use in violent
films and television programs, such as "Robocop," "Freejack," and "Miami Vice"
in order to create an association in the public eye between its products and acts of
violence." 6
In deciding whether the lower court should have allowed the plaintiffs' case
against Navegar to go to trial, the appellate court examined the issues of duty and
causation 7 The court relied primarily uponRowlandv. Christian"5 for its analysis
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 157.
229. Id. at 154-55.
230. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 157.
234. Id. Navegar pointed out that this claim merely meant that the surface was resistant to
damage from oil or sweat when handled, and that Navegar's finishing process had no actual effect on
the ability to obtain fingerprints from the weapon. Id. at 159. However, the trial court concluded that
some purchasers would interpret Navegar's claim as an assurance that they could use the TEC without
fear of leaving behind fingerprints that might identify them to the police. Id.
235. Id. at 156.
236. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157.
237. Id. at 161.
238. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
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of the duty issue.2 9 Under Rowland, the existence of a duty depends upon a
miscellany of factors. The major factors include
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of
preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant
and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to
exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the
availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk
involved.24
The court conceded that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor of a non-
defective firearm could be held liable merely for placing it in the market.
241
However, the court interpreted the plaintiffs' complaint as acknowledging an
existing baseline level of criminal conduct due to the presence of firearms in the
community and seeking to impose a duty on Navegar not to increase the already
existing risk. 2 The court cited Knight v. Jewet 42 for the proposition that
individuals could be held liable if they increased the inherent risks associated with
a particular activity.'" Like the game of touch football involved in Knight, the sale
of firearms in Merrill presented an element of danger that could not be eliminated
without effectively barring the activity altogether. However, the court agreed with
the plaintiffs that manufacturers and distributors should refrain from affirmatively
increasing the risks associated with their products.245 In its analysis, the court
distinguished between misfeasance and nonfeasance: ordinarily a person has no
duty to intervene in order prevent the increase of a risk in the absence of a special
relationship; however, in some cases, such a duty may be imposed in the absence
of a special relationship when a person's affirmative acts increase the risk to
another.24
Turning to the first of the Rowland court's factors, the court looked to see
whether the risk associated with the defendant's conduct was foreseeable.247
Although Navegar denied that it could have foreseen that its products would be
used in a killing spree, the court found that the manufacturer was well aware that
the TEC-DC9 was often used in criminal assaults and that many of its features were
239. Merrill, 89 Cal Rptr. 2d at 165.
240. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564.
241. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163.
242. Id.
243. 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).
244. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163-64.
245. Id. at 164.
246. Id. at 164-65.
247. Id. at 165-69.
[Vol. 53: 907
NEGLIGENT MARKETING
designed to appeal to criminal users.2' Consequently, the court concluded that
criminal acts, such as those of the plaintiffs' killer, were indeed foreseeable.249 The
court also determined that Navegar's conduct was "morally blameworthy."i2
0
Evidence of blameworthy conduct included: (1) Navegar's marketing of the TEC-
DC9 in a way that was calculated to bring it to the attention of those who were
likely to use it for criminal purposes; (2) Navegar's indifference to the fact that their
product was commonly used for criminal purposes; and (3) Navegar's marketing
director furnishing manuals and videotapes that demonstrated how to illegally
convert the TEC-DC9 into a fully automatic weapon."
Another consideration, according to the Rowland court, was the public interest
in preventing future harm. 2 The court in Merrill observed that the direct costs of
gunshot-related injuries amounted to $2.3 billion annually.1 3 Other costs included
such things as lost wages, pain and suffering, police resources, and "the
psychological insecurity we all suffer from living in a gun-infested society."' '4 The
court pointed out that public policy, as expressed by courts and legislative
institutions, strongly supported reducing these social costs."
The final Rowland-based factor that the court examined was the burden that
such a duty would impose on the defendant and on the community. 6 As the court
in Merrill explained, this element refers to the reasonable preventative measures
that the defendant would have to take to guard against a particular danger ifa duty
to exercise due care was imposed. 7 In this case, the gun manufacturers would
simply have to refrain from marketing their products to high-risk consumers, a
burden that the court felt was relatively easy for them to satisfy."5 Furthermore, the
court concluded that the adverse consequences to society also would be slight since
the TEC-DC9 had very little social utility anyway.5 9
In sum, the Merrill court determined that at least three of the Rowland
considerations supported imposing a duty upon Navegar not to market the TEC-
DC9 "in such a way as to increase the inherent risks posed by such a weapon."26
In response, Navegar contended that imposing such a duty would conflict with the
California Assault Weapons Control Act of 1989 (AWCA).26' According to
Navegar, since the manufacture, marketing, and out-of-state sale of the TEC-DC9
248. Id. at 166.
249. Id. at 167.
250. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 169-70 (citing Philip J. Cook et al., The Medical Costs of Gunshot Injuries in the
United States, 282 JAMA 447,454 (1999)).
254. Id. at 170 (quoting McClurg, supra note 3, at 792).
255. Id.
256. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170.
257. Id. (citing Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70 (Cal. 1997)).
258. Id. at 171.
259. Id. at 172.
260. Id. at 172.
261. Id. at 173; see CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12275-12277 (West 2000).
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were not prohibited by AWCA, imposing tort liability would be inappropriate as
long as the gun was not defective.262 However, the court disagreed with this
analysis; it emphatically declared that AWCA did not determine the scope of
Navegar's duty of care.26 Therefore, compliance with the statute would not relieve
the manufacturer of its duty to exercise due care in the marketing of the TEC-
DC9.2
Navegar also argued that imposing tort liability for negligent marketing would
constitute an impermissible judicial ban on manufacturing and selling its
products. 265 The court responded, somewhat disingenuously, by distinguishing
between state action that absolutely prohibited certain conduct and that which
merely required the actor to pay damages to those who were injured as a result of
this conduct.266 According to the court, imposing tort liability on Navegar did not
prevent it from continuing its current marketing practices; instead, it merely allowed
shooting victims to recover damages.2 67 The court regarded this prospect as
desirable since it would force Navegar to internalize the costs of its conduct and
create an incentive to reduce the risks associated with its present marketing
efforts.26' Furthermore, the court rejected Navegar's assertion that imposing tort
liability "would invade the prerogative of the legislature. '26 9 Rather, the decision to
recognize the existence of a duty to exercise due care with respect to marketing
semi-automatic handguns did not constitute a judicial decision that such products
should not be sold, but simply reflected the view that juries should be allowed to
decide whether Navegar's marketing practices were negligent or not.27
Having concluded that Navegar owed a duty to market its products in a
reasonable manner, theMerrill courtproceededto consider whether the defendant's
marketing practices actually caused the plaintiffs' injuries.2 7' Not surprisingly,
Navegar argued that there was no causal relation between its marketing efforts and
Ferri's criminal behavior.272 In particular, the gun manufacturer contended that the
plaintiffs had produced no evidence that Ferri ever saw any of the company's
advertisements or promotions.273 In response, the court declared that the plaintiffs
did not have to prove that Navegar's conduct was the sole cause of their injuries;
rather, they could satisfy the causation requirement by showing that Navegar's
conduct was a "substantial factor" in bringing about these injuries.274 The court also
concluded that a defendant's conduct couldbe characterized as a contributing cause
262. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 173.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 174-78.
265. Id. at 178.
266. Id. at 178-79.
267. Id.
268. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 179-80.
271. Id. at 185.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 186.
274. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 186.
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"if it created or increased the risk of such criminal or negligent acts even though the
defendant did not control the party" that actually caused the harm.27
Finally, the court responded to Navegar's claim that Ferri had not been
influenced by any of its marketing efforts by citing Stevens v. Parke, Davis &
Co.,276 In Stevens, a drug company was accused of "overpromoting" a drug and,
thereby, vitiating the warnings it provided to physicians. 277 Although the doctor who
had prescribed the drug for the plaintifftestified that he could not specifically recall
having read any of the defendant's promotional material, the California Supreme
Court nevertheless ruled that a jury could still reasonably conclude that the
company's promotional efforts consciously or subconsciously induced the doctor
to prescribe the drug." 8 The Merrill court concluded that the plaintiffs' case was
even stronger than the plaintiffs in Stevens.279 Since Ferri subscribed to numerous
gun and survivalist magazines, the court concluded that it was likely that he had
seen some ofNavegar's promotional material since the company advertisedheavily
in those publications.28 ° Furthermore, the court found that Navegar's promotional
material not only encouraged Ferri to purchase several of its semi-automatic pistols,
but they also assured him that he would have sufficient firepower to carry out his
intended plan to kill a large number of people.281
The majority opinion in Merrill provoked a lengthy dissent from Judge
Haerle. 22 First, the dissent accused the majority ofmischaracterizing the plaintiffs'
claim as one based on a duty not to increase an inherent risk whereas the plaintiffs
were actually seeking to hold Navegar liable for selling TEC-DC9s to the general
public.283 In addition, the dissent expressed doubts about whether there was any
doctrinal foundation for the majority's newly-discovered duty not to increase an
existing risk.284 The dissent also objected to the majority recognizing the plaintiffs'
negligent marketing claim, declaring that it had not been considered by any other
California court.28 ' Furthermore, the dissent argued that under existing California
law, an individual had no duty to prevent criminal misconduct by another in the
absence of a special relationship.2 6 Finally, the dissent took issue with the
conclusion that there was a causal connection between Ferri's shooting spree and
275. Id.
276. Id. at 187. See Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1973).
277. Stevens, 507 P.2d at 656.
278. Id. at 662.
279. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 188.
280. Id. at 188.
281. Id.
282. See id. at 193 (Haerle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Haerle concurred
in the majority opinion's treatment of the ultrahazardous activity claim. Id. (Haerle, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
283. Id. at 194-96 (Haerle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
284. Id. at 196-99 (Haerle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
285. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 199-200 (Haerle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
286. Id. at 200-01 (Haerle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Richards v.
Stanley, 271 P.2d 23 (Cal. 1954)).
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Navegar's marketing practices.8 7 Judge Haerle felt that once Ferri intended to
injure the plaintiffs, his choice of Navegar's weapons to carry out the crime was
purely coincidental.2 8
On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed the intermediate appellate
court's decision and reinstated the trial court's judgment for the defendant.29 The
court held that the plaintiffs' suit was based on a theory of product category liability
that was foreclosed by California Civil Code § 1714.4(a).290 Furthermore, even if
the plaintiffs were able to prove that the statutory provision did not apply, the
California court did not believe that there was any causal connection between the
defendant's marketing activities and the plaintiffs' injuries. 291
First of all, the court characterized the plaintiffs' case as a "products liability
action" within the purview of California Civil Code § 1714.4 (a).292 This provision
declared that "[i]n a products liability action, no firearm or ammunition shall be
deemed defective in design on the basis that the benefits of the product do not
outweigh the risk of injury posed by its potential to cause serious injury, damage,
or death when discharged." '293 The plaintiffs argued that their lawsuit was not a
product liability action within the purview of the statute because they were seeking
to hold Navegar liable because it "negligently designed, distributed, and marketed"
the TEC-DC9.294 However, the court rejected this argument, concluding that the
plaintiffs' real claim was that the weapon was defective in design because the risks
of making it available to the general public outweighed the product's benefits. 295 In
addition, the court determined the plaintiffs had failed to prove cause-in-fact
because they offered no evidence to show that Ferri was influenced by, or had even
seen, the defendant's promotional materials.296 According to the court, Ferri never
asked for the defendant's product by name, but apparently purchased the weapons
from a retail seller on the basis of price and performance characteristics.297
E. Suits by Governmental Entities Against Gun Manufacturers
Encouraged by the success of government lawsuits against tobacco
companies, 29s a number of municipalities have brought "recoupment" suits against
287. Id. at 209-14 (Haerle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
288. Id. at 212 (Haerle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
289. Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 133 (Cal. 2001).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 131.
292. Id. at 119; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.4(a) (West 1998).
293. Merrill, 28 P.3d at 119.
294. Id. at 124.
295. Id. at 126.
296. Id. at 132.
297. Id. at 133.
298. See Brent W. Landau, Note, State Bans on City Gun Lawsuits, 3 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 623,
624 (2000). For a discussion of state suits against tobacco companies and the resulting settlements,
see Hanock Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, andInjurious Industries, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 354,363-73 (2000); Mark D. Fridy, Note, How the Tobacco Industry May PayforPublic Health
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gun manufacturers to recover for gun-related governmental expenses.299 The City
of New Orleans brought the first of these suits in October 1998,30 suing fifteen gun
manufacturers, five local pawnshops, and three firearms trade associations for the
"costs of 'police protection, emergency services, police pensions, medical care, and
lost tax revenue related to handgun violence."' '30 A few weeks later, the City of
Chicago and Cook County sued tventy-vtwo gun manufacturers, twelve suburban
retail gun stores, and four distributors.3" 2 The Chicago suit sought $433 million for
police, medical, and welfare costs associated with gunshot wounds.30 3 Since then,
more than twenty other municipalities, including Bridgeport, Miami, Atlanta,
Philadelphia, San Francisco, Los Angeles, St. Louis, Seattle, St. Paul, Minneapolis,
Cleveland, and Detroit, have brought claims against gun manufacturers and their
trade associations. °
In many of these lawsuits, the cities claimed that the guns in question are
defectively designed because they are not equipped with appropriate safety
features. 0 ' In addition, some cities have contended that the gun manufacturers
failed to provide adequate warnings to consumers. 3" Finally, many cities have
Care Expenditures Caused by Smoking: A Look at the Next Wave of Suits Against the Tobacco
Industry, 72 IND. L.J. 235, 240-51 (1996); Tiffany S. Griggs, Comment, Medicaid Reimbursement
from Tobacco Manufacturers: Is the States'LegalPosition Equitable?, 69 U. COLO.L.REv. 799,805-
15 (1998).
299. See generally H. Sterling Burnett, Suing Gun Manufacturers: Hazardous to our Health,
5 Tax. REV. L. & POL. 433, 484-85 (2001) (discussing the status of the municipalities' lawsuits);
Timothy D. Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime-Related Injuries: Defining
a Suitable Role for the Tort System in Regulating the Firearms Industry, 65 Mo. L. REv. 1, 54-61
(2000) (recounting the municipal suits and the gun industry's response); BrianJ. Siebel, CityLawsuits
Against the Gun Industry: A RoadmapforReforming Gun Industry Misconduct, 18 ST.LoiusU. PuB.
L.REv. 247 (1999) (presenting two model approaches for municipalities' lawsuits, based on the New
Orleans and Chicago suits, plus other possible approaches); Frank J. Vandall, O.K Corral II Policy
Issues in Municipal Suits Against Gun Manufacturers, 44 VILL. L. REV. 547 (1999) (discussing the
economic, cause-in-fact, and proximate causepolicyissues ofcities' suits against gunmanufacturers);
Morgan, supra note 43 (discussing cities' tort actions against gun manufacturers).
300. Burnett, supra note 299, at 440; Landau, supra note 298, at 624-25.
301. Morgan, supra note 43, at 528-29 (quoting New Orleans Sues Manufacturers forHandgun
Violence, ANDREWs CONSUMER PROD. LrITG. RPTR., Dec. 1998).
302. Id.
303. Vandall, supra note 299, at 549.
304. Jon S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, New Courtroom Strategies Regarding Firearms: Tort
Litigation Against Firearm Manufacturers and Constitutional Challenges to Gun Laws, 36 HOUSTON
L. REV. 1713, 1745-46 (1999); Morgan, supra note 43, at 533-37.
305. See Anne Giddings Kimball & Sarah L. Olson, Municipal Firearm Litigation: IlI
Conceivedfrom AnyAngle, 32 CONN.L.REv. 1277,1280-81 (2000). For example, plaintiffs contend
that the defendants' handguns are defectively designed because they do not have a device that
indicates when there is a bullet in the chamber or a mechanism that would disable the weapon when
the magazine is removed. In addition, they argue that handguns should have "smart gun" technology,
which would allow only authorized persons to fire them. See James H. Warner, MunicipalAnti-Gun
Lawsuits: How Questionable Litigation Substitutesfor Legislation, 10 SETONHALL CONsT. L.J. 775,
784 (2000).
306. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 43, at 533-36 (stating that suits by Bridgeport, Miami, and
Atlanta included failure to warn claims).
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invoked a "public nuisance" theory30 7 under which liability may be imposed upon
those who create "an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public. 303 The cities claim that threats to public safety, and the economic costs of
gun-related violence caused by the marketing practices of gun manufacturers,
constitute just such an interference with public rights.30 9 For example, Chicago
alleged in its lawsuit that the defendants had created a public nuisance by
inundating suburban stores with firearms, knowing that they would be purchased
illegally by residents of Chicago.310 In another case, the city of Bridgeport,
Connecticut, alleged that the gun industry had "targeted [Bridgeport] because of its
high minority population."3"
The public nuisance theory described above bears a strong resemblance to that
form of negligent marketing based on unreasonable product distribution practices.
In both cases, liability is predicated upon distribution practices that make it easy for
people to obtain firearms illegally. In negligent marketing cases, individual
plaintiffs seek to recover damages for personal injuries, while in public nuisance
cases, municipal plaintiffs seek to recover damages for economic costs to the
community.3"2
It is too soon to tell how significant municipal suits against gun manufacturers
will be; many of these suits are still in the preliminary stages of the litigation
process. Among reported cases, the results are mixed, but the trend seems to be
running in favor of the handgun manufacturers.3 13 For example, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals recently rejected "public nuisance" claims against handgun
307. Landau, supra note 298, at 625; Morgan, supra note 43, at 533; Vemick & Teret, supra
note 304, at 1747-48.
308. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1) (1977).
309. See Morgan, supra note 43, at 550-52; Scott R. Preston, Comment, Targeting the Gun
Industry: Municipalities Aim to Hold Manufacturers Liable for Their Products and Actions, 24 So.
ILL. U. L.J. 595, 603-05, 612-13 (2000).
310. Landau, supra note 298, at 625; Jill R. Baniewicz, Note, Is Hamilton v. Accu-tek a Good
Predicotr of What the Future Holds for Gun Manufacturers?, 34 IND. L. REv. 419, 438-39 (2001).
311. Morgan, supra note 43, at 533.
312. In some cases, municipal plaintiffs have asked for injunctions to compel gun manufacturers
to change their marketing practices and to implement measures to reduce injuries associated with the
use of firearms. Kimball & Olson, supra note 305, at 1286-88. The NAACP has also brought suit in
New York to compel gun manufacturers to change the way they market their products. Vernick &
Teret, supra note 304, at 1754.
313. See, e.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 133-34 (Conn. 2001) (affirming
dismissal of suit by City of Bridgeport for lack of standing); Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., 778 So. 2d
1042,1044-45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming dismissal of suit by Miami-Dade county); Morial
v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1, 19 (La. 2001) (holding that suit by New Orleans was barred
by subsequently enacted statute). But see White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 833 (N.D.
Ohio 2000) (refusing to dismiss suit by city of Cleveland).
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manufacturers brought by local governments in Camden, New Jersey 314 and
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.315
F. The Future of Negligent Marketing Litigation
Just a few years ago, it appeared that negligent marketing was about to become
a powerful tool in products liability litigation, particularly where the products
involved were not "defective" in the traditional sense. The doctrinal and policy
arguments for a negligent marketing theory were laid out by Professor McClurg,
31 6
and a number of lawsuits against manufacturers of handguns and ammunition had
begun to work their way through the courts.317 Judge Jack Weinstein endorsed the
concept of negligent marketing in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek,318 as did Judge Guido
Calabresi in the dissenting opinion in McCarthy v. Olin Corp.319 The favorable
decision by a California intermediate appellate court in Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.
320
provided additional support toward what appeared to be an emerging consensus.
Plaintiffs' lawyers (and state officials) no doubt looked forward to bringing
negligent marketing claims on behalf of their clients against a wide variety of
product manufacturers. However, a dramatic turnabout occurred in 2001 when the
New York Court of Appeals and the California Supreme Court both rejected
negligent marketing claims brought against gun manufacturers by victims of gun-
related violence.
321
At the present time, no one knows whether other courts will agree with those
of California and New York or whether they will view the negligent marketing
theory in a more favorable light. A number of outstanding issues must be resolved
before ournation's courts can truly embrace the concept of negligent marketing. On
the doctrinal front, courts must confront troublesome issues in the areas of standard
of care, cause-in-fact, and duty. In addition, legal scholars need to give more
attention to the relationship between negligent marketing and private regulatory
agendas, commercial speech, and personal autonomy.
314. Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536,542 (3d
Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of the suit by a federal district court). See Camden County Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 245 (D.N.J. 2000).
315. City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming
dismissal ofthe suit by a federal district court for lack of standing). See City of Philadelphia v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
316. See McClurg, supra note 3.
317. See supra Part M.A-D.
318. 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
319. 119 F.3d 148, 157-75 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
320. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Ct. App. 1999).
321. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001); Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,
750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001).
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IV. DOCTRINAL ISSUES
Negligent marketing cases present certain doctrinal problems for plaintiffs,
particularly in the areas of standard of care, cause-in-fact, and duty. The traditional
"reasonable prudent person" standard of care provides no objective standard to
determine whether a particular marketing technique is "negligent" or not. Most
plaintiffs will not likely be able to prove cause-in-fact using the traditional "but for"
test, thereby requiring courts to develop other approaches to determine causation
issues. Finally, the traditional distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance or
malfeasance may have to be modified if plaintiffs are to recover under a theory of
negligent marketing.
A. Standard of Care
Unlike most forms of products liability, negligent marketing is a fault-based
theory.3 2 This distinction means that the plaintiff in a negligent marketing case
must show that the seller has failed to exercise "reasonable care" in some aspect of
the marketing process.3" The problem is to ascertain what reasonable care means
in these circumstances.
Generally courts and juries can easily determine what the applicable standard
of care should be in a particular case. For example, when the defendant is engaged
in a commonplace activity, such as driving an automobile, members of the jury can
rely upon their own personal experience to evaluate the defendant's conduct.324 In
other cases, the applicable standard of care may be officially promulgated by a
legislative body or administrative agency, and courts will treat any deviation from
this standard as "negligence per se."3" This rule means that one who violates the
official standard of conduct is deemed to be negligent as a matter of law.326
Customary practices within a trade or profession often provide strong evidence of
acceptable conduct. For example, the "generally accepted... standards" of the
medical profession establishes the controlling standard of care in medical
malpractice cases.327 Finally, safety standards or practices formally endorsed by
322. See, e.g., McClurg, supra note 3, at 795-96 (advocating negligent marketing claims against
gun manufacturers since strict liability claims have not been successful).
323. See id. at 806.
324. 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCrs LIABILITY, supra note 189, § 27:8, at 837-39.
325. See Gressman v. McClain, 533 N.E.2d 732, 735 (Ohio 1988) (holding that selling liquor
to an intoxicated person in violation of the law constitutes negligence per se); McIntyre v. Balentine,
833 S.W.2d 52, 59 (Tenn. 1992) (declaring that violation of a criminal statute is negligence per se).
326. See Staudinger v. Barrett, 544 A.2d 164, 167 (Conn. 1988); Carter v. William Sommerville
& Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274,278 (Tex. 1979).
327. See Keebler v. Winfield Carraway Hosp., 531 So. 2d 841,844 (Ala. 1988); see also Purtill
v. Hess, 489 N.E.2d 867 (II. 1986) (determining whether a particular expert was qualified to testify
to standard of care for medical malpractice case).
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industry trade associations, while not determinative, are often accorded
considerable weight in negligence cases.328
However, when no generally accepted standard of conduct exists juries must
decide standard-of-care issues by comparing the defendant's conduct with what a
hypothetical reasonable prudent person would have done in the same or similar
circumstances.329 Unfortunately, this formulation does not provide much guidance
in negligent marketing cases.
1. Negligent Marketing Claims Based on Product Design
Unlike other negligent marketing claims, those claims based on negligent
product design do require a jury to evaluate the defendant's conduct by reference
to relatively objective criteria. In a conventional design defect case, the plaintiff
must normally show that the existing design directly caused the harm in question
and that a feasible alternative design would have reduced the risk of this harm
occurring.33 At the same time, expert witnesses can provide information about the
cost of the plaintiff s proposed alternative design as well as evidence about the
potential accident cost savings that will accrue from adopting the alternative design.
In theory, a manufacturer can calculate these risks andbenefits before marketing the
product in question and presumably a jury can do the same after an injury has
occurred. Thus, the "standard of care" or standard for defectiveness is based on
principles of cost-benefit analysis.
In a negligent marketing case, the plaintiff's expert witness would argue that
certain features of the product, which increased its attractiveness to unsuitable users,
could be omitted without impairing the product's essential function. This approach
also involves employing cost-benefit analyses to determine whether the defendant's
conduct was reasonable or not. The only difference seems to be that in ordinary
design defect cases, the plaintiff's expert witness usually claims that the product
would have been less dangerous if certain safety features had been added, while in
negligent marketing cases, the plaintiff' s expert would argue that the product would
have been less dangerous if certain features had been removed from the existing
design.
The TEC-DC9 semi-automatic pistol in Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.33 provides a
good illustration of a product that contained certain design features that allegedly
328. See Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 1"03 So. 2d 603,610 (Fla. 1958); Reil v. Lowell Gas Co., 228
N.E.2d 707, 719 (Mass. 1967); see also Dr. S. David Hoffman & Matthew E. Hoffman, Use of
Standards in Products Liability Litigation, 30 DRAKEL. Rmv. 283 (1980-8 1) (studying the increasing
use of safety standards in products liability litigation).
329. See Mansfield v. Circle K Corp., 877 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Okla. 1994); Miller v. City of
Portland, 604 P.2d 1261, 1264 (Or. 1980); Gossett v. Jackson, 457 S.E.2d 97, 100 (Va. 1995).
330. See Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470, 1479 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying Utah law); Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176,1191 (Ala. 1985); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450
N.E.2d 204,208 (N.Y. 1983); see also RPSTATMENT(TinRD) oFTORTS: PRODUCTSLIABrLnTY § 2 cmt.
d (1998).
331. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Ct. App. 1999), rev'd, 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
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made it more attractive to criminals. Barrel shrouds, threaded barrels, and
fingerprint-resistant surfaces were not inherently dangerous in themselves, but at
least as far as the plaintiffs were concemed, they made TEC-DC9s more suitable
for criminal use than ordinary semi-automatic pistols.332
2. Negligent Marketing Claims Based on Advertising and Promotion
Negligent marketing claims based on advertising and promoting products
typically arise from actions by sellers that direct their marketing efforts at potential
consumers who are likely to harm themselves or others.333 Of course, no one would
suggest that advertising is wrongful per se. Advertising is a $350 billion a year
business; .. virtually all sellers engage in advertising and other marketing strategies
to retain their existing market share or to increase it either by inducing existing
users to increase consumption or by persuading other consumers to purchase the
product.335 Since sellers want to maximize the value of their advertising dollars,
they naturally tend to target particular groups on the basis of wealth, gender, age,
race, education, or other commercially relevant factors.336 While some forms of
targeting are clearly legitimate, others may not be. But how is good targeting
distinguished from bad targeting? The discussion below evaluates three different
approaches.
a. Targeting Minors
The first approach would confine negligent marketing liability to targeting
those who cannot legally use or consume the product in question. Thus, tobacco
companies and purveyors of alcoholic beverages would be subject to liability for
negligent marketing if they directed their advertising at minors with the intent to
induce them to purchase or consume the products in violation of the law. This
approach would clearly identify the type of targeting that is deemed to be negligent;
however, it would leave product manufacturers free to target everyone else.337
332. Id. at 156.
333. See supra Part II.B.
334. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 36, at 1430. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability,
6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. Rav. 213, 223 (2000) (citing Hanson & Kysar for the proposition that
manufacturers spend large amounts of money to "match the intricacies of human judgment and
thought").
335. See Karl A. Boedecker et al., Excessive Consumption: Marketing and Legal Perspectives,
36 AM. Bus. L.J. 301, 314 (1999).
336. See DeserieeA. Kennedy, Marketing Goods, MarketingImages: The Impact ofAdvertising
on Race, 32 ARiz. ST. L.J. 615, 649 (2000).
337. Even this approach does not provide a complete answer to the liability question because
it does not define what constitutes "targeting." Presumably only young children would watch a
cigarette smoking Mickey Mouse on television, but suppose a tobacco company chose Bart Simpson
to be its pitchman. Is the company targeting children as well as adults?
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b. Taking Advantage of Human Weaknesses
Another way to evaluate marketing practices is to determine whether the seller
has taken advantage of human weakness or vulnerability.33 In determining whether
a particular class of consumer might be more likely than the general population to
misuse the product and thereby harm themselves or others, a court might take into
account such characteristics as ethnic or racial affinity, education level, physical or
mental condition, socio-economic status, age, experience, or maturity.
Unfortunately, this approach has serious problems. One problem is the familiar
"slippery slope." Almost any identifiable group can be classified as vulnerable for
some purposes. Thus, in theory, liability could be imposed on tobacco companies
who develop cigarettes specifically for women or African-Americans, beer
companies who market special brands of beer to Native Americans or who develop
malt liquorproducts specifically for African-Americans, or handgun manufacturers
who tout the safety benefits of their products in women's magazines. One might
take this approach a step further and argue that tort liability should be imposed on
automobile companies whose advertising emphasizes the speed and power of their
cars and is presumably aimed at those who habitually drive too fast.'" Indeed, one
could also advocate liability for companies that advertise high-sugar cereal on
childrens' television programs4 or purveyors of fast food who encourage the
elderly to consume high-fat cuisine,34' or even product sellers that advertise dietary
supplements in sports magazines.342
Another problem with focusing on the supposed weakness or vulnerability of
particular segments of the consuming public is that target audiences are not
necessarily monolithic. For example, ninety-nine percent of a particular group may
be fully capable of using the product safely, while the remaining one percent is not.
Would advertising that targets such a group be negligent simply because a small
portion of the group is likely to cause harm? Would it be negligent for a gun
manufacturer to advertise its products at gun shows because a small fraction of the
338. For an early discussion of this issue, see A.A. White, The IntentionalExploitation ofMan 's
Known Weaknesses, 9 HOUSTON L. REV. 889 (1972).
339. See Gina M. DeDominicis, Note, No Duty at Any Speed?: Determining the Responsibility
of the Automobile Manufacturer in Speed Related Accidents, 14 HoFSTRA L. REV. 403, 426 (1986)
("Advertisements emphasizing speed and power are presumably targeted at a receptive audience of
drivers who frequently exceed the speed limit.").
340. See Comm. on Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 676 (Cal.
1983) (observing that defendant cereal companies were "engaged in a nationwide, long-term
advertising campaign designed to persuade children to influence their parents to buy sugared
cereals").
341. See Boedecker et al., supra note 335, at 303 ("McDonalds targeted the Arch Deluxe
sandwich, an item with high fat content, at older population segments already affected by blood
cholesterol levels.").
342. See Jennifer J. Spokes, Note, Confusion in Dietary Supplements Regulation: The Sports
Products Irony, 77 B.U.L. REv. 181,206 (1997) ("Sports bars and beverages are marketed to athletes,
as evidenced by their presence in sporting goods and health food stores, as well as by numerous
advertisements in sports magazines.").
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people attending might be criminals or terrorists? Or should a cigarette company be
liable for using cartoon characters in advertising directed at adults, knowing that
young children may see them as well?
c. The Learned Hand Approach
A third approach focuses more explicitly on risks and benefits in the manner
proposed by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.143 In that
case, Judge Learned Hand suggested that a defendant's conduct would be
considered unreasonable when the burden of taking precautions against a particular
harm was less than the cost of the harm multiplied by the probability of the harm
occurring.34 When applied in the context of negligent marketing, one side of the
equation would be the burden to the seller of changing its existing marketing
practices. This burden would primarily involve lost profits because of reduced sales.
The other side of the equation would involve a statistical calculation of product-
related injuries that were attributable to existing marketing practices. A
manufacturer would be guilty of negligence if the costs associated with changing
existing marketing practices were less than the costs associated with the risk of
injuries that could be avoided by making the changes.
Like the risk-utility test used in design defect cases, the Learned Hand test's
usefulness depends upon whether the parties can come up with specific and credible
numbers to plug into the equation. If reliable, quantifiable information about costs
and benefits is not available, the Learned Hand approach will not be very useful.
3. Negligent Marketing Claims Based on Negligent Distribution
Practices
Distribution practices are another potential source of liability under negligent
marketing theory. These practices include distributing a dangerous product so as to
facilitate access to it by unsuitable users and failing to require retailers to take
reasonable measures to reduce product-related risks.
a. Facilitating Access to Unsuitable Users
One type of claim would hold a manufacturer liable for negligent marketing if
its distribution methods contribute to operating a black market for the product. In
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek,345 for example, the plaintiffs alleged that gun manufacturers
sent large numbers of firearms to southern states with weak gun regulations,
knowing that many of these weapons would ultimately be resold illegally in states
that regulated legal gun sales more strictly.346 According to the plaintiffs, the
343. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
344. Id. at 173.
345. 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
346. Id. at 830-32.
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manufacturers knew that the number of guns being shipped to gun dealers in the
South greatly exceeded the expected demand based on population and demographic
data.34 7 This assertion was apparently enough for the jury in Hamilton to conclude
that the defendant's distribution practices amounted to negligent marketing. 34
Based on the result in Hamilton, the primary issue in a negligent marketing case
based on product distribution practices would seem to be whether the defendant
knew or should have known how its products would be distributed after leaving its
possession. Under this form of negligent marketing, the focus would be on: (1)
what the manufacturer knew or should have known and (2) whether the
manufacturer actually had the ability to reduce the risk of illegal sales by modifying
its distribution practices in some way.
The first consideration is largely a matter of fact. For some products,
manufacturers may have a good deal of information about consumer demand for its
products. If this demand suddenly increases without any apparent reason, a
reasonable manufacturer should try to discover what has caused this increase. In
addition, distributors, government sources, or news accounts might also alert the
manufacturer to the existence of a problem. For example, the manufacturer of the
prescription painkiller OxyContin had no warning that its product was being widely
misused in Appalachia until a newspaper reporter broke the story.349 Once a
manufacturer knows that its products are being purchased illegally, it must then
decide whether to restructure its distribution practices in order to respond to the
problem. This decision involves considering feasibility and cost. At the very least,
the manufacturer would have to exercise greater control over the activities of its
distributors. In many cases, the manufacturer can control the behavior of its
distributors by contractual agreement; in other cases, some sort of physical
monitoring might be needed. Obviously, these efforts will be costly and may not
solve the problem.
b. Exercising Control Over Retail Sales
Another basis for negligent marketing liability is failure to supervise retail gun
sellers in order to prevent them from selling guns to unsuitable persons. This basis
of liability assumes that gun manufacturers must supplement the existing scheme
of federal regulation over retail handgun sales."' Handgun manufacturers would be
expected to train retail sellers on how to identify criminals and "straw man"
purchasers, restrict distribution of handguns to franchised retail outlets, and refuse
347. Id.
348. Id. at 810-11.
349. See Tough, supra note 50.
350. For a discussion of current federal regulation of handgun sales, see Polston, supra note 44,
at 824-28.
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to sell handguns to dealers who have sold a disproportionate number of guns
involved in the commission of crimes.35'
Of course, there are two problems with imposing this sort of duty upon firearm
manufacturers. First, monitoring the behavior of distant retailers to ensure they live
up to their obligations would be very expensive. Second, all of these efforts are
likely to be ineffective as long as criminals are able to obtain weapons from second-
hand sellers and black market sources.
B. Causation
Normally, the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant's conduct was a
cause-in-fact of his injury. The "but for" test is the legal test for causation that is
most often employed. However, plaintiffs are likely to have great difficulty proving
causation on a "but for" basis in negligent marketing cases. Because of this, some
courts may permit injured parties to invoke less restrictive tests of causation in order
to prove their case.
1. The "But For" Test
Courts generally apply the traditional "but for" or "sine qua non" test to
determine causation issues in personal injury cases.352 Under this approach, the
plaintiff must prove that he would not have been injured if the defendant's act had
not occurred.353 Obviously, a great many negligent marketing claims would fail if
courts required plaintiffs to prove "but for" causation. For example, in order to
prove causation in a negligent marketing case based on product design, the plaintiff
would have to show that his injury would not have occurred if the defendant had
not designed its product in a particular way. In other words, the plaintiff would have
to convince ajury that the person who committed the injury did so only because of
the product's design and would not have chosen some other product to commit the
art.
Proving causation might be even harder for plaintiffs who base their negligent
marketing claims on the seller's advertising andpromotional activities. It is difficult
enough to show a causal connection between advertising and general consumption
351. See Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative Institutional
Analysis, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1247, 1256 (2000); Siebel, supra note 299, at 251.
352. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 168, at 409 (2000).
353. Id.
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patterns;3. it is likely to be even harder to prove that the defendant's advertising
induced a particular consumer to purchase a specific product. 5
Proof of causation may also be a problem in cases where the manufacturer
distributes its product in a way that allegedly facilitates black market sales. Greater
control by manufacturers over the activities of distributors and retail sellers might
reduce the scale of black market activities somewhat, but they cannot eliminate
these activities entirely. Despite the government's best efforts at regulation,
unauthorized persons have always been able to obtain handguns, alcoholic
beverages, and cigarettes. Thus, plaintiffs will have a difficult time persuading a
judge and jury that they would not have been injured had the defendant exercised
greater control over the product's distribution.
2. The Substantial Factor Test
Some states now allow plaintiffs to use the "substantial factor" test instead of
the traditional "but for" test.3 6  Under the substantial factor approach, the
defendant's act is treated as a cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs injury even though the
injury would have occurred anyway, if the jury determines that the act is a
substantial factor in causing the injury.37 This test is properly used in cases where
two actions occur and either one alone is sufficient to cause the injury.3Y8
At least one court has employed the substantial factor test in a negligent
marketing case.359 The California intermediate appellate court would have enabled
the plaintiff to establish causation, using the substantial factor test, even though it
acknowledged that the killer would probably have committed the crime if the
defendant's product has not been produced and marketed.360 Fortunately for the
defendant, the California Supreme Court overruled the lower appellate court,
concluding that the plaintiffhad failed to prove causation even under the substantial
factor test. 6 Nevertheless, the fact remains that there is no objective standard that
354. See Timothy D. Lytton, Halberstam v. Daniel and the Uncertain Future of Negligent
Marketing Claims Against Firearms Manufacturers, 64 BROOK.L.REv. 681,704 (1998) ("The alleged
causal connection between marketing firearms and violent crime remains largely unsubstantiated.");
Jef I. Richards, Politicizing Cigarette Advertising, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1147, 1153 (1996) (declaring
that numerous studies have failed to verify the existence of a direct causal connection between
cigarette advertising and smoking levels).
355. See Merrill v. Navegar, 28 P.2d 116, 132 (Cal. 2001) (concluding that there was no
evidence that defendant's advertising influenced the killer to purchase that particular brand of
firearm).
356. See Vandall, supra note 299, at 558 (discussing causation issues in cigarette and handgun
product liability litigation).
357. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 (1965).
358. See, e.g., Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45
(Minn. 1920) (representing a seminal case for the substantial factor test).
359. See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d i46 (Ct. App. 1999).
360. See id. at 186-89. One member of the court concluded that "Ferri was going to buy some
gun to commit his planned carnage; he did not commit it because he had two TEC-DC9s as opposed
to some other model of weapon."). Id. at 212 (Haerle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
361. Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 130-33 (Cal. 2001).
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can be used to determine whether the defendant's action is a "substantial" factor in
causing the plaintiff s injury or whether it is merely an insubstantial one. Except in
the most obvious case, the substantial factor test provides scant protection to
defendants, especially unpopular ones, when the causation issue is left to the jury.
3. The Probabilistic Approach
A novel theory of causation, which originated in mass toxic tort cases, would
allow plaintiffs who have been exposed to toxic substances to satisfy the causation
requirement by: (1) establishing a probability of causation, usually by reference to
epidemiologic studies and (2) showing a specific causal link between their injuries
and exposure to the defendant's product, typically by medical testimony to the
effect that there is no other explanation to account for the injuries.362 Once the
plaintiff offers proof of causation under these criteria, the burden of proof then
shifts to the defendant to disprove causation by showing that the plaintiff could not
have been exposed to its product.363
The plaintiffs attempted to apply a version of this theory of causation in
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, arguing that the defendants' distribution practices with
respect to handguns was analogous to releasing toxic substances into the
environment.364 The court in that case expressed sympathy with this novel causation
theory, but declined to specifically adopt it, concluding that the plaintiffs had
satisfied their burden of proof on the causation issue under a traditional approach.365
4. Enterprise Liability
Some courts have adopted causation rules that effectively impose collective
liability on the industry as a whole rather than requiring a plaintiff prove which
manufacturer caused the injury in question. One example of this trend is "enterprise
liability," a doctrine that permits a plaintiff to sue an industry trade association on
the theory that promulgating standards, or some other action by the association,
contributed to his injuries.366 The rationale for enterprise liability is that the trade
association owes a duty to promulgate adequate safety standards when individual
companies within the association delegate this power to it.
The plaintiff in Hamilton v. Accu-Tek attempted to rely on the enterprise
liability theory in order to avoid identifying the party who actually manufactured
362. See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory
of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2117, 2122-29 (1997).
363. See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989) (involving
market share liability and DES), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
364. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 834 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
365. Id.
366. See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding
an industry trade association liable for failing to promulgate adequate standards for blasting cap
warning labels); Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46
FORDHAm L. REv. 963 (1978) (suggesting that enterprise liability theory be used in DES cases).
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the handgun used to shoot him. The trial court refused to apply this theory,
concluding that the gun manufacturers did not exercise joint control over the risk.367
Despite this setback, courts may eventually prove more receptive to the enterprise
liability theory in cases where it can be shown that industry trade associations
helped to develop common marketing strategies.
5. Market Share Liability
The concept of market share liability enables plaintiffs to recover from each
member of an entire industry based on its market share of the product sold. Under
traditional causation rules, the plaintiff must prove that a specific defendant caused
his injury. To recover, a plaintiff who is injured by a product made by several
manufacturers must identify the actual maker.368 However, the principle of market
share liability, first articulated by the California Supreme Court in Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories,3 69 allows a plaintiff to sue all of the makers of the offending product
and to recover a pro-rata share from each manufacturer based on their respective
share of the product's market.370
Not surprisingly, proponents of greater liability for handgun manufacturers
argue that market share liability should be applied in negligent marketing cases,37'
and in fact, Judge Weinstein did allow the jury to apportion the plaintiffs damage
award according to the principles of market share liability.3 72 In Hamilton v. Accu-
Tek, the plaintiff conceded that the gun that caused his injury was not recovered, so
he could not identify the weapon's manufacturer.373 Applying the concept of market
share liability, the jury apportioned damages among three gun manufacturers.374
However, when the market share liability issue was certified to the New York Court
of Appeals, that court concluded that market share liability was inappropriate in gun
injury cases because firearms were not fungible products like DES; therefore, it was
not impossible for victims to identify the actual manufacturer.375 In addition, the
court observed that the degree of risk created by various gun manufacturers varied
considerably.376 Consequently, apportioning liability solely on the basis of market
share would be unfair in a negligence case.377
The concept of market share liability is extremely helpful to plaintiffs in cases
where they cannot identify the product that caused the harm, or where many
367. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 843.
368. See Fischer, supra note 189, at 1625.
369. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
370. Klein, supra note 189, at 886.
371. See, e.g., Vandall, supra note 299, at 560-61 (stating that the Sindell rule would enable
courts to hold gun manufacturers liable based on their market share).
372. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 843-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
373. Id. at 808-09.
374. Id. at 811.
375. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1066-67 (N.Y. 2001).
376. Id. at 1067.
377. Id.
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products have contributed to the harm. It is also an effective way to burden an entire
industry with liability. When courts award damages on a market share liability basis
in class actions or other forms of "mass tort" litigation, these awards act very much
like an excise tax levied (without going through any sort of legislative process)
upon the defendant industry.
C. Duty
Courts tend to resolve the duty issue by distinguishing between nonfeasance
and affirmative misconduct-misfeasance, particularly when deciding whether or
not someone has a duty to protect another from harm caused by a third person .1
8
The general rule, at least as far as affirmative acts are concerned, is that each person
owes a duty of due care to avoid causing physical harm to others.379 Producing and
marketing a product is considered an affirmative act, so product sellers generally
owe a duty to users and consumers, as well foreseeable bystanders, to refrain from
placing defective goods into the stream of commerce.38
On the other hand, there is normally no affirmative duty to protect another from
harm when one has neither expressly assumed such a duty nor affirmatively created
the risk.381' However, certain "special relationships" may be sufficient to impose a
duty to act-either a duty to rescue one who is endangered or to prevent a potential
risk from arising in the first place. Special relationships between defendant and
victim may include employer and employee,382 teacher and student,38 3 common
378. For a discussion of the nonfeasance/misfeasance dichotomy, see John M. Adler, Relying
Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About the Current State of Common Law
Affirmative Duties toAid orProtect Others, 1991 Wis. L.R Ev. 867, 872-77 (1991); Ernest J. Weinrib,
The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 251-58 (1980).
379. See DOBBS, supra note 352, § 227.
380. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1962) ("A manufacturer
is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.").
381. See Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N.E. 301, 302 (Mass. 1928) (affirming dismissal of wrongful
death action against defendant who failed to rescue drowning man whose canoe had overturned);
Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959) (affirming dismissal of suit against defendant for failing to
come to the aid of individual who voluntarily jumped into water-filled pit and drowned); Steven J.
Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REv. 673, 682-85 (1994) (discussing the
traditional "no duty" rule); Stephen D. Sugarman, Assumption ofRisk, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 833, 841-46
(1997) (discussing rationales for the traditional "no duty" rule in nonfeasance cases).
382. See Anderson v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 333 U.S. 821,823 (1948) (holding
that railroad company was required to search for employee who fell off moving train in very cold
weather); Carey v. Davis, 180 N.W. 889, 890-92 (Iowa 1921) (declaring that farm owner had a duty
to render assistance to unconscious farm laborer); Szabo v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 40 A.2d 562, 563
(N.J. 1945) (finding that employer had a duty to aid employee who suffered from sunstroke); Rival
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 306 P.2d 648, 651-53 (N.M. 1957) (affirming lower court
judgment against railroad company for failing to provide prompt medical care to employee who
became ill from heat prostration).
383. See Pirkle v. Oakdale Union Grammar Sch. Dist., 253 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Cal. 1953) (declaring
that school employees owe a general duty of reasonable care to their students); Schultz v. Gould
Academy, 332 A.2d 368, 372 (Me. 1975) (holding that boarding school had a duty to protect female
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carrier and passenger,384 jailor and prisoner,385 innkeeper and guest,386 and
shopkeeper and customer.387 The second type of special relationship may exist
between the defendant and a third party whose behavior may pose a threat to the
plaintiff.388 This type includes such relationships as employer and employee, 89
student attacked by intruder while sleeping in her dormitory room).
384. See Yu v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 144 A.2d 56, 58-59 (Conn. 1958)
(holding railroad company liable for failing to help disabled passenger exit train); Middleton v.
Whitridge, 108 N.E. 192, 197-98 (N.Y. 1915) (declaring that railroad company employees had a duty
to aid passenger who appeared to be ill).
385. See Iglesias v. Wells, 441 N.E.2d 1017,1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (concluding that a sheriff
may be held liable for frostbite injuries suffered by mentally incompetent prisoner released from jail
during inclement weather); Farmer v. State, 79 So. 2d 528, 530-31 (Miss. 1955) (holding that jail
officials had a duty to provide medical treatment for prisoner's ulcers while he was in their custody);
Dunham v. Vill. of Canisteo, 104 N.E.2d 872, 875,877 (N.Y. 1952) (concluding thatpolicehad a duty
to provide medical assistance to unconscious man placed in their custody).
386. See West v. Spratling, 86 So. 32, 36 (Ala. 1920) (affirming that hotel had a duty to warn
sleeping guestwhen firebroke out); Texas Hotel Co. ofLongview v. Cosby, 131 S.W.2d 261, 262-63
(Tex. Civ. App. 1939) (same).
387. See Morgan v. Bucks Assocs., 428 F. Supp. 546,549-550 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (concluding that
owner of shopping center had a duty to protect customers against assaults in its parking lot); Winn-
Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Johnstoneaux, 395 So. 2d 599, 599-600 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (upholding jury
verdict finding thatsupermarket couldbe held liable forinjuries to customerrobbed in its parking lot);
Connelly v. Kaufmann & Baer Co., 37 A.2d 125 (Pa. 1944) (affirming that a department store may
be held liable for negligent delay in coming to the aid of child who had caught his finger in the store's
escalator).
388. See Adler, supra note 378, at 876-77.
389. See Hogle v. H. H. Franklin Mfg. Co., 92 N.E. 794,795 (N.Y. 1910) (affirming employer
could be held liable for allowing employees to throw pieces of iron out of upper windows of factory,
thereby injuring occupant of adjacent lot).
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parent and child,39 teacher and student,' landlord and tenant,392 common carrier
and passenger,393 jailor and prisoner,394 and innkeeper and guest.395
In many of the negligent marketing cases discussed earlier, the courts have
tended to place a great deal of emphasis on the duty issue. Since the question of
whether a duty exists is normally one for the court to decide,396 presumably courts
focus on duty when they want to decide the ultimate question of liability themselves
instead of leaving it to the jury.
In negligent marketing cases, courts have used one of two types of duty
analysis, depending on how they characterize the defendant's conduct. When they
believe that marketing practices have affirmatively created a risk of harm to others,
courts tend to employ a balancing test to determine whether a defendant owes a
duty of reasonable care. For example, the intermediate appellate court in Merrill,
concluded that no special relationship need be established when the defendant's
conduct "affirmatively increased the risk."'3 97 In order to determine the scope of the
390. See Bieker v. Owens, 350 S.W.2d 522, 524-26 (Ark. 1961) (stating that parents could be
held liable for failing to prevent their sons from attacking smaller children); Basler v. Webb, 544
N.E.2d 60,62-63 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (reversing dismissal of suit against guardians of six-year-old girl
who injured nine-year-old plaintiff while riding a bicycle); Caldwell v. Zaher, 183 N.E.2d 706, 707
(Mass. 1962) (holding that parents had a duty to supervise child who was known to assault and molest
younger children); Bocock v. Rose, 373 S.W.2d 441, 442-445 (Tenn. 1963) (holding that plaintiff
stated a cause of action against parents for failure to prevent attack against him by their minor
children).
391. See Brahatcek v. Millard Sch. Dist., 273 N.W.2d 680, 687 (Neb. 1979) (stating that school
personnel had a duty to supervise physical education class in which student was accidently struck by
golf club wielded by another student).
392. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 480-81 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(holding that owner of apartment building has a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect tenant from
being assaulted and robbed in hallway); Johnston v. Harris, 198 N.W.2d 409, 410-I1 (Mich. 1972)
(declaring that landlord may owe a duty to tenant who was attacked and robbed in foyer of apartment
house); Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436, 445 (N.J. 1980) ("[A] landlord has a legal duty to take
reasonable security measures for tenant protection on the premises.").
393. See McPherson v. Tamiami Tours, Inc., 383 F.2d 527,533 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding that bus
driver had a duty to protect African-American passenger against unprovoked assault by another
passenger); Bullock v. Tamiami Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326, 332 (5th Cir. 1959) (holding thatbus driver
had a duty to warn inter-racial couple from Jamaica about risk of sitting together).
394. See Breaux v. State, 326 So. 2d 481, 483 (La. 1976) (holding that prison officials had a
duty to protect prisoner against being stabbed to death by another inmate); Taylor v. Slaughter, 42
P.2d 235, 236-37 (Okla. 1935) (concluding that officials at city jail were required to use reasonable
care to protect prisoner against attack by other prisoners).
395. See Fortney v. Hotel Rancroft, Inc., 125 N.E.2d 544,546-47 (111. App. Ct. 1955) (reversing
ajudgment against a plaintiff who was assaulted in his hotel room by an intruder); Miller v. Derusa,
77 So. 2d 748, 749 (La. Ct. App. 1955) (concluding that the proprietor of a bar had a duty to protect
a patron against an unprovoked attack by another bar patron); McFadden v. Bancroft Hotel Corp., 46
N.E.2d 573, 575 (Mass. 1943) (affirming judgment in favor of a hotel guest who was attacked in the
hotel dining room by another guest).
396. To note how gun cases have recognized this premise, see McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d
148, 156 (2d Cir. 1997); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 818 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Merrill v.
Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 162 (Ct. App. 1999); Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 123
(Cal. 2001); Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 469 N.E.2d 339, 340 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
397. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165.
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defendant manufacturer's duty, the court examined factors enumerated by the
California Supreme Court in Rowland v. Christian.39 These factors included the
foreseeability of the plaintiff's harm, the certainty of plaintiff's injury, the closeness
of the connection between the defendant's actions and the plaintiffs injury, the
culpability of the defendant's conduct, the desirability of preventing future harm,
and the burdens and benefits of imposing such a duty.399 Based on these factors, the
court concluded that the manufacturer did owe a duty not to engage in marketing
practices that increased the inherent risks associated with the production and
distribution of firearms."' Judge Calabresi, dissenting in McCarthy v. Olin
Corp.,401 suggested that, if it could be justified on public policy grounds, courts
might extend a duty to protect a person from harm by third parties even in the
absence of some relationship between the manufacturer and either the victim or the
individual who caused the harm.402
However, most of the time courts refuse to impose a duty upon manufacturers
in the absence of a special relationship. Apparently, many of these courts reject the
notion that the defendant's marketing activities have directly created a risk and,
therefore, constitute affirmative acts of misfeasance. Rather, the assumption, mostly
unspoken, seems to be that the defendant's conduct can best be characterized as
nonfeasance. Accordingly, these courts usually conclude that the defendant has no
duty to protect another against the criminal acts of a third party unless some sort of
special relationship exists.403 The opinion of the federal appeals court in McCarthy
v. Olin Corp.4 4 illustrates this reasoning. In that case, the court noted the absence
of any special relationship between the defendant and the third party who used the
defendant's Black Talon bullets to shoot the plaintiff.0 5 As the court observed, the
defendant has no way to control the actions of a remote and unknown retail
purchaser; hence there was no reason to impose a duty upon the defendant to
prevent such acts from occurring.40 6 The New York Court of Appeals in Hamilton
v. Beretta US.A. Corp. 7 expressed concern that imposing a duty to protect
someone from harm in the absence of a special relationship would open the door to
unlimited liability."3 According to the court, the special relationship requirement
effectively limited the class of potential plaintiffs who could bring claims against
the defendant and ensured that the defendant would not be held liable for injuries
it could not possibly prevent."
398. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
399. Id. at 564.
400. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165-73.
401. 119F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997).
402. Id. at 168 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
403. See Leslie v. United States, 986 F. Supp. 900, 912 (D.N.J. 1997); First Commercial Trust
Co. v. Lorcin Eng'g, Inc., 900 S.W.2d 202, 204-05 (Ark. 1995).
404. 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997).
405. Id. at 157.
406. Id.
407. 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001).
408. Id. at 1061-62.
409. Id.
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Finally, some judges have accepted the need for a special relationship
requirement, but also have been willing to expand the category of relationships
upon which a duty to act has traditionally been predicated. For example, in
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek,410 Judge Weinstein contended that the relationship between
Accu-Tek and its downstream distributors and retailers gave it sufficient control
over the downstream conduct to support a duty on Accu-Tek's part to ensure that
the first time their products were sold, the sale would be by a responsible merchant
to a responsible purchaser.4 '
The duty analysis in negligent marketing cases apparently depends on whether
the defendant's conduct involves negligence in product designing, marketing, or
distributing. Product design clearly involves affirmative acts, and there is no real
difference in that respect between defective and non-defective products. Thus, if the
design of a semi-automatic pistol creates additional risks to bystanders because it
appeals to criminals, courts might reasonably conclude that the manufacturer has
a duty to take the bystander's safety into account when it designs the product.4"2
This same analysis can be applied to advertising and promotional efforts by a
manufacturer. Advertising and other forms of promotion involve affirmative acts
and, therefore, may give rise to a duty of due care.
Negligent distribution is more complicated. Arguably, developing specific
distribution networks and procedures are affirmative acts, which may create a duty
of due care. On the other hand, a manufacturer's failure to actively monitor retail
sales or to supervise the conduct of distributors and retail sellers seems more like
nonfeasance than misfeasance. Accordingly, traditional duty analysis under the
nonfeasance/misfeasance dichotomy would suggest that no duty exist in such cases.
V. OTHER ISSUES
Imposing tort liability on sellers who negligently market dangerous products
arguably promotes a number of desirable social objectives. First, additional tort
liability would create a financial incentive for manufacturers to exercise greater care
in choosing marketing strategies. Second, courts recognizing negligent marketing
claims would enable victims to obtain compensation for their injuries. Finally, by
awarding damages, particularly punitive damages, juries could express their
disapproval of business practices that violate minimum standards of decency.
In theory, allowing plaintiffs to recover damages would force manufacturers to
internalize accident costs. 413 Manufacturers that deliberately market their products
to teenagers, criminals, or mentally unstable individuals will have a financial
410. 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
411. Id. at 820.
412. Of course, this analysis does not preclude a finding that the manufacturer exercised due
care in designing its product and thereby satisfied its duty to the bystander.
413. See, e.g., Craig Brown, Deterrence and Accident Compensation Schemes, 17 U. W. ONT.
L. REv. 111, 128 (1978-79) (discussing market deterrence theory and the efficacy ofplacing accident
costs on those engaged in a particular activity).
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incentive not to target such buyers if they are required to pay for the injuries that
these consumers inflict upon themselves or innocent third parties. By incentivizing
more responsible marketing activities, this liability will reduce the risk of injury to
consumers and third parties. Negligent marketing liability may also incentivize
manufacturers to discourage retail sellers from allowing dangerous products to fall
into unauthorized hands. Negligent marketing liability may also have the desirable
consequence of compensating accident victims who may otherwise be left without
a remedy for their injuries. This imposition of tort liability allows accident costs to
be shifted from injured parties to product manufacturers who can then spread these
costs in small increments to individual consumers. 4
Finally, allowing negligent marketing claims will increase litigation against
manufacturers of dangerous products. This increase can serve an educational
purpose by informing the public about the risks associated with consuming or using
certain products.41 In addition, plaintiffs lawyers can obtain information about
questionable business practices on the part of manufacturers by examining
documents during the discovery process.416
Nevertheless, courts should be cautious about recognizing any new theory of
liability based on negligent marketing. First, some litigants will bring negligent
marketing claims against product manufacturers in order to put them out of business
or to force them to accept quasi-regulatory limitations on their activities.417 Second,
liability for negligent marketing may impose an unreasonable burden on
commercial speech. 8 Also, negligent marketing is based on a paternalistic and
elitist view of society that is incompatible with the principle of personal
autonomy.419
A. Promoting Private Regulatory Agendas
Although tort law is primarily intended to compensate accident victims, it may
sometimes be used for prohibitionist or regulatory purposes as well. Public
advocacy groups finance or sponsor lawsuits against manufacturers in order to force
414. See Tyrone Hughes, Note, Hamiltonv. AccuTek [sic]: Potential Collective Liability of the
Handgun Industry for Negligent Marketing, 13 TOURo L. REv. 287, 301 (1996) ("One of the policy
reasons for recognizing a collective liability theory against the handgun industry in a negligent
marketing claim is that manufacturers are in a better position than victims to absorb or spread the
cost.").
415. See Robert Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. RaV.
853,877 (1992).
416. See Lytton, supra note 351, at 1264 (observing that plaintiffs have obtained information
about the marketing practices of the gun industry through examination of internal documents); Cliff
Sherrill, Comment, Tobacco Litigation: Medicaid Third Party Liability and Claims for Restitution,
19 U. ARY. LrrrLERoCKL.J. 497,509-10 (1997) (discussing how such information was obtained from
cigarette company documents).
417. See infra Part V.A.
418. See infra Part V.B.
419. See infra Part V.C.
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them to take certain products off the market.42 Another litigation tactic often
employed by governmental entities is to bring suits against product manufacturers
with the intention of forcing them to accept quasi-regulatory measures as part of a
negotiated settlement.42' If negligent marketing were to be generally accepted by the
courts, prohibitionists and regulators will quickly use it to advance their own private
agendas.
1. Lawsuits as a Mechanism for Putting Product Sellers Out ofBusiness
Proponents of negligent marketing often argue that accident costs associated
with using handguns or consuming cigarettes and other undesirable products should
not fall on individual victims or on the public at large, but instead should be shifted
back to the manufacturer and treated as a cost of production; this shift would cause
the price of such products to rise and thus reduce demand for them.4" However, in
reality many of those who extol the benefit of tort liability for gun manufacturers
or cigarette companies view tort litigation as a means of crippling or destroying
these industries rather than simply a mechanism for internalizing accident costs.423
Furthermore, certain developments in the litigation process during the past several
decades have increased the chances of bankrupting product manufacturers by means
of huge damage awards. One such development is the class action, which enables
plaintiffs to aggregate their claims in products liability cases;424 another
development is the practice of awarding punitive damages in products liability
cases.
425
Plaintiffs enjoy definite advantages when aggregating their claims in a class
action. If the class is large enough, the plaintiffs will be able to hire large law firms
to represent them.426 These firms can afford to spend whatever it takes to prepare
a case for trial and, if necessary, can finance the case through the appellate process
as well.427 Similarly governmental agencies, medical insurers, and large pension
plans can also retain large law firms.
420. See Timothy A. Bumann, A Products Liability Response to Gun Control Legislation, 19
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 715, 733 (1995); David B. Kopel & Richard E. Gardner, The Sullivan
Principles: Protecting the Second Amendment From CivilAbuse, 19 SETONHALLLEGIS. J. 737,750,
768-72 (1995).
421. See infra Part V.A.2.
422. See Fridy, supra note 298, at 236; Joi Gardner Pearson, Comment, Make It, Market It, and
You May Have to Pay for It. An Evaluation of Gun Manufacturer Liability for Criminal Use of
Uniquely Dangerous Firearms in Light of In re 101 California Street, 1997 BYUL. REv. 131, 158-59.
423. Bumann, supra note 420, at 733; Kopel & Gardner, supra note 420, at 750.
424. See 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODuCTs LIABILITY, supra note 189, § 26:7.
425. See, e.g., 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 189, § 18:1, at 218
(reporting bankruptcy of asbestos industry).
426. Indeed, many of these firms actively pursue such cases. See Deborah R. Hensler & Mark
A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-LegalAnalysis, 59 BROOK. L.
REv. 961, 1025 (1993); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L.
REv. 469, 480 (1994).
427. Weinstein, supra note 426, at 480.
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Punitive damage awards pose an even greater threat to product manufacturers,
particularly in class actions and other cases that involve aggregated claims. For
example, a Miami jury recently awarded $145 billion in punitive damages against
cigarette manufacturers, illustrating the serious threat punitive damages pose to an
unpopular product manufacturer.428 Negligent marketing cases can pose similar
concerns since plaintiffs will inevitably try to characterize product sellers as greedy,
predatory, and indifferent to the safety of customers or innocent third parties. In
theory, trial judges or appellate courts are supposed to reduce excessive or
unreasonable punitive damage awards; there is no guarantee that they will actually
do so.'
2. Regulation Through Litigation
Recently, former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich identified a practice known
as "regulation through litigation," by which government entities bring lawsuits
against manufacturers of products like handguns or cigarettes.43 The ostensible
purpose of these lawsuits is to recoup medical costs and other expenses costs borne
by state and local governments as the result of injuries caused by the defendants'
products.43' However, in many instances, the real purpose of these lawsuits is to
procure a settlement that will impose quasi-regulatory conditions on the
manufacturer with respect to the production, design, or marketing of the product in
432question. The tentative settlement between the tobacco industry and various state
officials, ultimately rejected by Congress, was a classic case of regulation through
litigation.433 Other examples include the recent settlement between the Federal
Department of Housing and Urban Development and Smith & Wesson43 4 and the
RICO action the Justice Department brought against the tobacco industry in 1999.
4 3S
428. See Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 CA-22, 2000 W 33534572, at * 13
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6,2000). For a discussion of the Engle case, see Virginia A. Canipe, Note, Crossing
the Effectiveness Line: The Implications ofBMW v. Gore on Multi-Billion Dollar Tobacco Litigation
Punitive Damages, 36 WAKE FOREr L. REV. 1157 (2001).
429. See 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODucTs LiA.BrrY, supra note 189, § 18:6, at 306-28
(discussing remittitur of punitive damage awards).
430. See Robert B. Reich, Regulation Is Out, Litigation Is In, USA TODAY, February 11, 1999,
at 15A; see also Jonathan Turley, A Crisis of Faith: Tobacco and the Madisonian Democracy, 37
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 433, 435-37 (2000) (finding the lack of congressional action to regulate the
tobacco industry gave rise to an increased number of lawsuits); Ed Dawson, Note, Legigation, 79 Tax.
L. REV. 1727, 1728 (2001) (noting that "such suits serve as an engine to achieve policy goals which
have not been achieved through the legislative process").
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. The terms of the proposed settlement contained a number of quasi-regulatory provisions.
For a brief description of the settlement's terms, see David S. Samford, Cutting Deals in Smoke-Free
Rooms: A Case Study in Public Choice Theory, 87 Ky. L.J. 845, 879-90 (1998-99).
434. See Warner, supra note 305, at 785-93.
435. See Sandra L. Gravanti, Note, Tobacco Litigation: United States Versus Big Tobacco-An
Unfiltered Attack on the Industry, 52 FLA. L. REv. 671, 672 (2000).
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Governmental entities can be powerful adversaries. They typically represent
thousands of injured parties; consequently, large sums of money are at stake in
cases that governmental entities bring against product manufacturers. Furthermore,
governmental entities often have more credibility with jurors than private plaintiffs,
and government officials and their allies in the community can attack defendants
out ofcourt through "public interest" advertisements, press releases, and interviews.
All of this power is likely to put intense pressure on defendants to settle negligent
marketing suits brought by government entities, even though the settlement
agreement may severely restrict their management powers.436
Many individuals and organizations regard regulation through litigation as a
perfectly legitimate tactic. In their view, special interests exercise excessive
influence over legislatures and administrative agencies and often prevent useful
regulatory measures from being enacted or enforced.437 For example, the tobacco
industry has successfully lobbied against substantial tax increases for cigarettes, and
the National Rifle Association has thwarted attempts to enact more rigorous gun
control measures by the federal government.438 Lawsuits offer a way to circumvent
these special interest groups' power and to subject the producers of dangerous
products to some form of social control.439 On the other hand, some commentators
have expressed concern that this sort of litigation is contrary to democratic
principles. As Secretary Reich has declared, these lawsuits amount to "end runs
around the democratic process."" The legislative process, though flawed in many
respects, operates in the open and is accessible to all interested parties. In contrast,
only the immediate parties to a lawsuit draft the terms of a settlement, and
negotiations are usually conducted in secret.
Unfortunately, negligent marketing lends itself well to regulation through
litigation., Moreover, there are plenty of tempting targets available such as tobacco
companies, handgun manufacturers, purveyors of alcoholic beverages,
manufacturers of lead paint, and possibly others.44 1 And, because the stakes are high
and because negligent marketing claims are open-ended and fact-specific,
436. See generally Samford, supra note 433 (discussing the elements of government-sponsored
settlement agreements).
437. See Lytton, supra note 351, at 1247 ("Proponents of the suits argue that litigation is a
legitimate way to regulate a powerful industry whose lobbying efforts have distorted the legislative
process."); Reich, supra note 430.
438. Reich, supra note 430.
439. See Lytton, supra note 351, at 1251-52.
440. Robert B. Reich, Don't Democrats Believe in Democracy?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2000, at
A22.
441. See Dagan & White, supra note 298, at 355 ("Industries waiting in the wings for this
treatment include lead paint makers, and perhaps even brewers, distillers, and producers of fatty
foods."); Robert A. Levy, Tobacco Medicaid Litigation: Snuffing Out the Rule ofLaw, 22 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 601, 648 (1998) ("[T]here can be no doubt that tobacco is only the first in a long list of products
from which the nanny state will protect us. What comes next-coffee, soft drinks, red meat, dairy
products, sugar, fast foods, automobiles, sporting goods?"); Sherrill, supra note 416, at 515 ("T]he
same reasoning behind the medicaid suits applies equally to products such as milkshakes,
cheeseburgers, and other high-fat foods with negative or minimal nutritional value.").
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defendants have no way to predict the probable outcome of lawsuits based on this
theory of liability. For this reason, many of them are likely to agree to settlement
terms that amount to "faux legislation."" 2
B. Tort Liability as a Unreasonable Burden on Commercial Speech
Another concern of courts recognizing negligent marketing liability is that this
liability may impose an unreasonable burden upon the commercial speech rights of
product manufacturers. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution
prohibits Congress from enacting laws that restrict free speech or expression. 3 This
right of free expression is also protected against legislative restrictions by state and
local governments.4" However, not all speech or expressiontraditionally receives
the same degree of constitutional protection. 5 "Core speech," which includes
political discourse," 6 as well observations about art, literature, science, religion, and
similar subjects, 47 enjoys the highest degree ofprotection." The government may
not regulate this type of speech, at least on the basis of content, except when
necessary to advance a compelling governmental interest." 9
At the other extreme is so-called "low value" speech, such as fighting words,
defamation, obscenity, and child pornography, which is thought to present a high
risk of social harm without conferring any meaningful benefit upon society."' The
442. This term was coined by Secretary Reich. See Reich, supra note 430.
443. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
444. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 599 n.2 (1980) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
445. See John L. Diamond & James L. Primm, Rediscovering Traditional Tort Typologies to
Determine Media Liabilityfor Physical Injuries: From Mickey Mouse Club to Hustler Magazine, 10
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 969, 971 (1988) ("Since Chaplinsky, the Court appears to have
consistently stratified speech, finding certain classes to be subordinate to others on a hierarchical
scale.").
446. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587; Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
390 (1969); David A. Logan, Tort Law and the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 51 U. Prrr.
L. Rnv. 493, 497 (1990) C"[P]olitical speech-speech about matters of self-governing importance-is
the essence of our democratic system and deserves the full protection of the first amendment.'); Paul
B. Stephan Il, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 207 (1982)
("Perhaps the leading theme in the Supreme Court's cases is the primacy of political speech.").
447. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) ("[O]ur cases have never
suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical
matters ... is not entitled to full First Amendment protection.").
448. See Thomas C. Kates, Note, Publisher Liability for "Gun for Hire" Advertisements:
Responsible Exercise of Free Speech or Self-Censorship?, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1203, 1206 (1989)
("These divergent views have led to a designation of certain types of speech as 'core speech,' entitled
to the most stringent first amendment protection.").
449. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc.
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984) (holding that
"[r]egulations whichpermit the Governmentto discriminate on the basis of the content ofthe message
cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment').
450. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189, 194 (1983) (discussing the concept of low value speech).
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government has considerable leeway to regulate low value speech as long as it can
show a rational basis for its actions.4"'
Commercial speech appears to occupy an intermediate position between core
speech and low value speech in the First Amendment's protective scheme. 52
Commercial speech may be defined as speech that proposes a commercial
transaction' or more broadly, "expression related solely to the economic interests
of the speaker and its audience."4"4 According to the Supreme Court's holding in
the Central Hudson case, the government can only regulate lawful commercial
speech if: (1) regulation is necessary to advance a substantial governmental
interest; (2) the regulation in question directly advances the interest; and (3) the
regulation is no more extensive than necessary. 5 - In the past several decades the
Court has struck down numerous governmental attempts to restrict commercial
speech." 6
Although most free expression cases involve direct regulation by governmental
entities, clearly courts will protect free expression against the chilling effect of civil
liability as well. In a long line of cases, beginning with New York Times v.
Sullivan,457 the United States Supreme Court has limited the scope of state
defamation law in order to protect First Amendment rights against the chilling
effect of damage awards.45 In addition, a number of federal and state courts have
concluded that sellers of books, movies, and records are protected against product
451. See Peter Alan Block, Modern-Day Sirens: Rock Lyrics and the First Amendment, 63 S.
CAL. L. Rnv. 777, 794 (1990).
452. See Howard K. Jeruchimowitz, Tobacco Advertisements and Commercial Speech
Balancing: A Potential Cancer to Truthful, Nonmisleading Advertisements of Lawful Products, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 432, 443 (1997) ("The Supreme Court has afforded commercial speech a limited
measure of protection in recognition of its subordinate First Amendment position."); Lars Noah,
Authors, Publishers, and Products Liability: Remedies for Defective Information in Books, 77 OR.
L. REv. 1195, 1224 (1998) ("At present, the Court utilizes a form of intermediate scrutiny to assess
challenges to restrictions on commercial speech."). However, please note that some legal scholars,
such as Professor Martin Redish, believe that judgments about the relative values of commercial
versus noncommercial expression do not provide an acceptable justification for varied regulatory
treatment. See Martin H. Redish, TobaccoAdvertising andtheFirstAmendment, 81 IOwAL.REv. 589,
594-97 (1996).
453. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978).
454. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,561 (1980).
455. Id. at 566.
456. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (striking down federal law
forbidding beer manufacturers from revealing the alcoholic content of beer on product labeling);
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (finding regulation that banned cold calls by accountants to
potential clients invalid); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993)
(concluding that ordinance prohibiting newsracks on public property when used to distribute
commercial handbills instead of newspapers was invalid); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S.
557 (striking down regulation prohibiting advertisements that advocated the use of electricity); Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (invalidating
statute prohibiting pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices).
457. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
458. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29 (1971); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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liability claims when the alleged "defect" is content-based. 9 Presumably, courts
would also be willing to grant relief to product sellers if they determined that certain
forms of tort liability imposed an unreasonable burden on commercial speech.
A number of concerns exist regarding the impact of negligent marketing
liability upon commercial speech. One concern is that liability apparently may be
based on the fact that the manufacturer has directed its advertising and promotional
activities at a particular audience. To be sure, such liability may be appropriate
when the producer of a dangerous product, such as cigarettes or alcoholic
beverages, targets those who are forbidden by law from purchasing them. Perhaps,
one could justify tort liability against a manufacturer who encourages children to
purchase or use any product that is dangerous or unsuitable for those who are
underage. 60 However, even if courts were inclined to impose tort liability for
negligent marketing based on advertising that improperly targets children, First
Amendment issues must still be addressed for negligent marketing claims based on
advertising directed towards adults.
As the Supreme Court has observed, the First Amendment not only upholds the
right of sellers to communicate with the public, it also ensures that consumers will
have access to information about goods and services that are available to them in
the marketplace. 6 1 Obviously, access to such information would be severely
reduced if juries were allowed to determine what information was suitable (and
what was not) with respect to product advertising aimed at adult consumers.
A second concern about the negligent marketing theory is that liability is not
based solely on publishing false or misleading statements, but can also be imposed
on manufacturers who disseminate opinions and truthful information about their
products. In Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.,4"2 for example, the court observed that the
manufacturer had claimed in its promotional materials that the surface of its semi-
automatic pistol had "excellent resistance to fingerprints." 63 The court apparently
believed that because this information would encourage criminals to purchase the
459. See McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding singer Ozzy
Osborne not liable for teenage listener's suicide based on lyrics in recorded song); Byers v.
Edmondson, 712 So. 2d 681 (La. Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1143 (1999) (holding that
producers of the film NaturalBorn Killers were not liable for copy-cat killings); see also Richard C.
Ausness, TheApplication ofProductLiabilityPrinciples to Publishers of Violent or Sexually Explicit
Materials, 52 FLA. L. REv. 603, 641-60 (2000) (addressing First Amendment protection for movies,
video games, and web sites).
460. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding validity of state statute
prohibiting the sale of sexually-oriented but non-obscene magazines to persons under the age of
seventeen); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) ("The state's authority over children's
activities is broader than over like actions of adults."); John C. Cleary, Note, Telephone Pornography:
First Amendment Constraints on Shielding Children from Dial-A-Porn, 22 HARV. J. ONLEGIS. 503,
523-24 (1985) (pointing out that the state may prohibit disseminating materials to minors that would
not be considered obscene under the standards applied to adults).
461. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,437 (1993) (Blackmun,
J., concurring); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,763
(1976).
462. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Ct. App. 1999).
463. Id. at 157.
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defendant's product (and presumably put it to criminal use), it should hold the
manufacturer liable for publishing it. Likewise, in McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger &
Co.,'" the plaintiffs alleged that "advertisements for the Black Talon bullets
highlighted their destructive capabilities and therefore made them attractive to
criminals." '465 Although the plaintiffs did not prevail in that case, they obviously felt
that the manufacturer should be held liable for disclosing this information to the
general public.
Liability based on negligent marketing is not limited to factual statements, but
may also extend to expressions of opinion. For example, in Merrill the plaintiff
cited the manufacturer's slogan, "tough as your toughest customer," as evidence of
negligent marketing.466 Of course, "puffing" is an ancient, if not entirely honorable,
marketing practice, and sellers are normally free to emphasize the utility, quality,
or desirability of their products as long they confine themselves to expressions of
opinion and do not actually make false statements of fact. 7 This approach makes
sense because it is very hard, if not impossible, to categorize expressions of opinion
as "true" or "false." However, if negligent marketing claims are allowed,
manufacturers will be subjected to tort liability for suggesting that smoking or
drinking may be desirable, glamorous, or sophisticated.4t Obviously, imposing
liability for such expressions of opinion raises serious free speech issues.
C. Paternalism Versus Personal Autonomy
The concept of negligent marketing arguably rests on the elitist notion that
certain groups of people are incapable of making reasonable decisions about the
products they buy. To be sure, this assumption may be justified in the case of young
children and teenagers." However, proponents of negligent marketing also believe
that substantial numbers of adults cannot act responsibly either.
Certain negligent marketing claims rest on the notion that manufacturers should
not target certain groups of people because they are incapable of making reasonable
decisions about the products they buy. Obviously, situations may exist where such
paternalism is appropriate, as for example, where young children or teenagers are
464. 916 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
465. Id. at 369.
466. Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157.
467. See W.PAGEKEETONETAL., PROSSERANDKEETONONTORTS, § 109, at 757 ("The 'puffing'
rule amounts to a seller's privilege to lie his head off, so long as he says nothing specific.").
468. See Sylvia A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy andAdvertising, 77 IOWAL. REv. 909,919 (1992)
(stating that advertisements for alcoholic beverages suggest that drinking is associated with success,
glamor, and sophistication); Levin, supra note 35, at 238-39 ("Current ads continue leaving the
unmistakable impression that smoking is desirable and even associated with healthy activities.").
469. See JoHNH. GARVEY, WHATAREFREEDOMSFOR? 91 (1996) ("Children often do things that
are dumb, thoughtless, impulsive, short-sighted, ill-advised, selfish, and screwy."). Garvey also states
that "normal adults" behave this way as well. Id.
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involved." ° Thus, a case can be made for imposing civil liability on those that
manufacture cigarettes or alcoholic beverages if they knowingly direct their
advertising at underage consumers who cannot legally purchase their products.
Perhaps this reasoning could also be extended to support tort liability for
manufacturers that market dangerous products, such as motorbikes or all-terrain
vehicles, to consumers they know are too young or inexperienced to use them
safely.
However, some people also believe that certain categories of adult consumers
need protection against predatory and seductive advertising as well. They criticize
the manufacturers of cigarettes and alcoholic beverages for developing pro duct lines
aimed at potential consumers who belong to particular racial or ethnic minorities.
For example, R.J. Reynolds was forced to withdraw "Uptown" cigarettes from the
market in 1990 due to negative criticism from some members of the black
community. 4 Indeed, some commentators have condemned the sale of menthol
cigarettes in general because menthol brands appeal most strongly to African-
Americans.472 Commentators have also criticized brewers of malt liquor,
particularly the "Colt 45 Premium" brand, for marketing a high-proof alcoholic
beverage to black males.473 Likewise, the targeting of Native Americans by the
makers of "Crazy Horse Malt Liquor" was condemned474 as were efforts to market
certain alcoholic beverages in the Latin-American community.475 Finally, in its
lawsuit against handgun manufacturers, the city of Bridgeport, Connecticut,
accused the gun industry of directing its marketing efforts at the city because of its
high minority population.476
Commentators also expressly disapprove of advertising and other promotional
efforts by handgun manufacturers that target women.477 Examples of such targeting
include marketing a .32 caliber handgun called "Bonnie" for women to go along
with a larger .38 caliber model called "Clyde" for male customers.4" Another
example involves introducing a revolver with a smaller grip, called the
470. Id. See Richard C. Ausness, "Waive" Goodbye to Tort Liability: A Proposal to Remove
Paternalism From Product Sales Transactions, 37 SAN DINGo L. REv. 293, 333-35 (2000) (giving
examples of young children and teenagers exercising exceedingly bad judgment).
471. See Kathryn A. Kelly, The Target Marketing of Alcohol and Tobacco Billboards to
Minority Communities, 5 U. FLA. J. L. &PUB. POL'Y 33, 57 (1992).
472. See Vernellia R. Randall, Smoking, The African-American Community and the Proposed
National Tobacco Settlement, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 677,688 (1998) (stating that seventy-five to ninety
percent ofAfrican-American smokers prefermenthol cigarettes, compared twenty-three to twenty-five
percent of white smokers).
473. See Kelly, supra note 471, at 58-59.
474. See Celeste J. Taylor, Know When to Say When: An Examination ofthe TaxDeductionfor
AlcoholAdvertising that Targets Minorities, 12 LAW & INEQ. 573, 585 (1994).
475. Id. at 586.
476. See Morgan, supra note 43, at 533.
477. See Note, Harnessing Madison Avenue: Advertising and Products Liability Theory, 107
HARv. L. REV. 895, 905 (1994).
478. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 36, at 1463.
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"Ladysmith," for female customers.479 Another criticism of gun manufacturers is
that their advertising suggests to women that gun ownership is "chic" or necessary
for personal safety.48 Cigarette advertising aimed at female consumers has also
come under fire in recent years.48 ' For example, developing cigarettes like "Virginia
Slims" especially for women has been condemned because the ads associated
glamor and thinness with smoking.
412
Commentators have also criticized efforts of cigarette companies to target those
in lower socioeconomic groups by increasing their advertising in "blue collar"
publications such as Popular Mechanics and sports magazines.483 Another example
of alleged exploitation of the working class is the introduction and promotion of
"Dakota" brand cigarettes by RJR Nabisco to "young, less-educated females." 4
With the exception of the Bridgeport suit mentioned above, no one has yet
brought suit against product manufacturers for targeting women, racial minorities,
or low-income consumers. However, one would expect that claims predicated on
this sort of targeting will be brought in the future if the courts embrace the theory
of negligent marketing. This prospect is troublesome. To be sure, as critics of such
advertising correctly point out, misuse of firearms, cigarettes, and alcohol cause
more harm among certain groups than the general population.4 ' Consequently, the
sale of firearms, cigarettes, and alcohol to these groups would be reduced if courts
allowed negligent marketing suits based on targeting to be brought. However,
restricting advertising in this manner will place a significant burden on personal
autonomy and decision-making.
VI. CONCLUSION
The theory of negligent marketing would allow an injured party to recover
damages from the seller of a non-defective product if the product's design increases
its appeal to consumers who are likely to injure themselves or others. In addition,
manufacturers may be subject to liability if they market their products in a way that
increases the risk that they will be purchased by unsuitable persons. Finally,
manufacturers may be held liable under negligent marketing if they fail to supervise
retail sellers of their products.
479. Id.
480. See Dobray & Waldrop, supra note 37, at 113-15.
481. See Law, supra note 465, at 913.
482. See Calvert, supra note 36, at 411.
483. See Law, supra note 468, at 913.
484. See Boedecker et al., supra note 335, at 302.
485. See Raymond E. Gangarosa et al., Suits by Public Hospitals to Recover Expenditures for
the Treatment of Disease, Injury and Disability Caused by Tobacco and Alcohol, 22 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 81, 87 (1994) (declaring that abuse of alcohol and tobacco products is more prevalent among
lower socioeconomic groups); Kelly, supra note 471, at 34 (stating that the black community is
plagued by alcohol and tobacco-related health problems); Taylor, supra note 474, at 573 (observing
that alcohol abuse is common in minority populations).
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So far, most negligent marketing cases have involved handguns, but this novel
theory of liability could easily be applied to many other products such as cigarettes,
alcoholic beverages, or prescription drugs. Until recently, negligent marketing
liability appeared that it might be accepted by the courts. However, two cases
decided last year, Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.486 and Merrill v. Navegar,
Inc.,487 cast serious doubt about the future of negligent marketing as a viable legal
theory.
There are a number of problems with negligent marketing. For example, the
applicable standard of care is extremely elusive; in most cases, the normal rules of
causation will have to be relaxed if the plaintiff is to prevail; and traditional duty
rules appear to foreclose liability in most instances. In addition, litigants could
easily bring negligent marketing claims against certain manufacturers to put them
out of business or force them to agree to quasi-regulatory limitations on the
marketing or distributing their products. Furthermore, by imposing liability based
on the content of a seller's advertising, negligent marketing claims may place an
unreasonable burden on commercial speech. Finally, the concept of negligent
marketing liability is paternalistic and inconsistent with personal autonomy. For
these reasons, I believe that courts should reject negligent marketing claims and let
other branches of government regulate those marketing practices that are truly
harmful to public safety.
486. 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001).
487. 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001).
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